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CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The theory of optimal tariffs essentially took form 
with the writings of Edgeworth in 1894 (1925), 
Bickerdike (1906), and Kaldor (1940). Although it is 
well-known that—under domestic free market 
conditions—free trade represents a Pareto equilibrium 
for the world as a whole, the theory of optimal tariffs 
attempts to show that free trade is not necessarily the 
optimal welfare position for a country that possesses 
some degree of monopoly power with respect to commodity 
prices. That is, if a country is economically large 
enough to affect its terms of trade, then the theory of 
optimal tariffs concludes that it is possible for that 
country to increase its welfare by imposing some 
tariff—assuming that the other country does not 
retaliate. The graphical analysis of this theory is 
covered in most international trade textbooks. For 
example, in Figure 1.1, point E represents free trade 
equilibrium. Uj' represents the highest indifference 
curve that country one can reach, given that country 
two's offer curve stays where it is. This indifference 
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Optimal tariff with no retaliation 
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curve is tangent to the given offer curve at point B, so 
country one would place the appropriate tariff to shift 
its offer curve through point B. For a good 
presentation of the mathematical derivation of the 
optimal tariff with no retaliation, see Takayama (1972), 
which parallels the original work by Graff (1949). The 
conclusion of the theory is that if only an import 
tariff is used, and there is no retaliation, the formula 
for the optimal ^  valorem tariff (T) is 
T = 1 
e - 1 (1.1) 
Where (e) is the elasticity of the foreign country's 
offer curve. 
Of course, if a country does impose its optimal 
tariff, some country now has a lower welfare level than 
it did before, and it seems plausible that the country 
adversely affected would consider some form of 
retaliation. In an effort to increase the explanatory 
power of the theory, several attempts have been made to 
revise this critical assumption. 
The initial models, such as those of Johnson 
(1953), used a Cournot (equivalently a Stackelberg—two 
follower) type of argument in which a country imposing 
an optimal tariff naively assumes that the other country 
will not alter its terms of trade in response to the 
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imposition of the tariff. Most of the models also 
postulate that the tariff proceeds will be redistributed 
to consumers—either directly or indirectly. 
Using these assumptions, Johnson derives reaction 
curves for each country which represent the optimal 
tariff given the other country's current tariff policy. 
They are derived as follows : 
The tangency points of one country's 
indifference curves with the other's offer 
curves trace out loci of optimal-tariff 
equilibrium points (welfare-reaction curves) 
for the respective countries. 
A simple example of such a reaction curve is shown in 
figure 1.2. Country two is presumed to accept country 
one's offer curve as given, hence, indifference curves 
are shown tangent to several possible country one offer 
curves (at the points). By connecting these points, 
the reaction curve is derived. Note that the curve 
does not have to be as "nice" as it is drawn here. For 
example, it could change curvature several times. Using 
these curves, Johnson demonstrates that two situations 
can arise. Either some equilibrium point will be 
reached at an intersection of the reaction curves 
(after some indeterminate number of retaliations by each 
country), or a tariff cycle will result in which some 
country applies its optimal tariff, the second country 
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Optimal tariff—derivation of reaction curve 
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retaliates, and the first country's optimal welfare 
position now necessitates a reduction in the tariff 
rate, causing country two to decrease its tariff rate. 
Johnson assumes that both countries consider themselves 
to be Cournot followers, and stay on their reaction 
curves, leading (for example) to an equilibrium at point 
B in figure 1.3. Or, this tariff cycle would continue 
indefinitely. The final welfare conclusion (in both 
cases) is that either country, but not both, could end 
up with a higher level of welfare than it had initially, 
or both countries might have lower levels of welfare. 
Using a similar type of analysis, Horwell (1966) 
analyzed the difference between _ad valorem and specific 
tariffs. His conclusions are that with the Cournot 
model of retaliation, the reaction curve generated by an 
ad valorem tariff lies further out than one generated by 
a specific tariff. See figure 1.4. Hence, in most 
cases, an ad valorem tariff will yield a higher level of 
welfare for the initiating country than would a specific 
tariff. 
Gorman (1958) analyzes the elasticity of demand for 
imports to determine "the effects of tariffs on the 
volume and terms of trade," and "the conditions under 
which a given country will gain from a tariff war." He 
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Country I and country II are both Cournot followers 
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Reaction curves for ^  valorem and specific tariffs 
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then goes on to approximate how much the volume of trade 
would decrease in a tariff war, under different 
elasticity of import conditions. Similarly, he presents 
a range of elasticity conditions under which a country 
could conceivably gain from engaging in a tariff war. 
Rodriquez (1974) demonstrates that with a Cournot 
model, in a two country, two good model, optimal import 
quotas are not equivalent to optimal tariffs. In fact, 
"optimal quota retaliation will lead to the elimination 
of international trade between the countries involved." 
Tower (1975) demonstrates the same conclusion when both 
countries are using export quotas. For example, in 
figure 1.5, country two acts first and imposes an 
optimal export quota to force the equilibrium point to 
point A. 
Country two's new offer curve is denoted by Oa'a. 
Country one now perceives that they can achieve the same 
level of imports for a smaller level of exports, so they 
impose a quota, yielding offer curve Oba'. Responding 
to this new offer curve, country two will impose a more 
restrictive tariff. This process will continue until 
trade goes to zero. Tower arrives at the same 
conclusion (trade goes to zero) if one country imposes 
an optimal tariff and the other an optimal quota. 
10 
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Both countries use optimal export quotas 
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Some attention has been paid to the assumption that 
the tariff revenue is redistributed to consumers. 
Bertrand (1973) considers the case where the revenue is 
used by the government, and he maximizes a government 
welfare function dependent on an export good and an 
import good. By maximizing a Langrangean expression of 
welfare subject to balance of trade equilibrium in both 
countries, he shows that the optimal tariff rate is 
T1 = eje-|-j/(ej-l)(ejj-l) (1.2) 
where the e^ and e^j are the elasticities of the foreign 
and domestic private sector offer curves respectively. 
Tower (1977) considered the case where the tariff 
revenue is redistributed to consumers, but instead of 
maximizing a welfare function, he maximizes the tariff 
revenue, and demonstrates that if the home trade 
indifference curves are strictly concave, and the 
foreign offer curve has a continuous first derivative, 
then the maximum revenue tariff will be larger than the 
optimal tariff. 
The early work of Graff (1949) presenting a 
multi-commodity welfare maximization case was extended 
by Vandendorpe (1972), and more recently by Ghosh 
(1979). Using the notation of Ghosh, for n commodities. 
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with tariffs a^ (i = l,n), for some set of tariffs 
unalterable, the optimal values for the controllable 
tariffs are found by maximizing a utility function 
subject to a concave transformation surface, balance of 
goods market, and market clearing conditions. Letting 
E£ represent excess demand for the ith commodity, the 
optimal tariffs are 
= -(ZZDih(dEj/dai)aj)/|D| (1.3) 
where |D| is the determinant (dEj/da^), for i,j = 
m+l,...,n and is the cofactor of the i-hth element 
of that determinant. This equation reduces to a^ = 
zbjSj where Zbj = 1. Both Vandendorpe and Ghosh were 
also concerned with second-best analysis. That is, they 
attempt to derive the optimal tariff and consumption and 
production taxes if some institutional constraints on 
the use or level of tariffs or taxes are present. The 
early work of Vandendorpe (1968) was extended (within a 
two country-two commodity case) to three tax 
instruments, with two arbitrarily fixed, by Dornbusch 
(1971). For Eg representing the elasticity of the 
foreign offer curve, P the domestic price, and MSG the 
marginal social cost of an additional unit of exports, 
then the optimal tariff is shown to be 
13 
1 P-MSC E 
2 T = (1.4) 
P Eg-l 
The first part is the traditional optimal tariff formula 
and the second part is derived from a weighted average 
of domestic taxes. Similarly, Markusen (1975) was 
interested in a second-best optimal intervention. He 
specifically covered a model of two countries related by 
a "bilateral production externality." For example, he 
covers a case where consumption and production taxes are 
arbitrarily constrained to zero. In this case, the 
optimal tariff is the sum of four terms. The first term 
is simply the standard optimal tariff. The second term 
is "due to the existence of domestic pollution," and is 
always negative. It will lower the optimal import 
tariff relative to the foreign elasticity of supply. 
The third term is based on the fact that the "consumer's 
marginal rate of substitution may depend upon the total 
flow of pollution," and the sign is ambiguous. The 
fourth term is "due to the existence of the foreign 
pollution externality," and is always positive. 
Essentially, "the gains of exploiting monopoly power in 
trade can only be bought at the expense of an increase 
in domestic production," and hence, pollution. 
Similarly, Gehrels (1971) considered the relationship 
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between optimal tariffs and optimal taxes on investment, 
and the second-best conclusions when one of the 
interventions is constrained. Using three factors of 
production (land, labor, and capital), Gehrels maximizes 
welfare as a function of consumption subject to the 
production constraint, and balance of trade. By 
maximizing with respect to exports, and the amount of 
foreign investment, the optimal tariff is shown to be 
(1.5) 
Note that r and p are the international terms of trade 
and lending respectively. N is the elasticity of demand 
for home-country exports of good 2; Fp/X2r is the "ratio 
of investment income to value of good 2 traded; and 
Ep/Er is the elasticity of the interest rate with 
respect to the terms of trade." In general, the sign of 
the bracketed term is ambiguous, but in the particular 
case that Gehrels examines; where the home country 
exports capital intensive good 2, and is a net exporter 
of capital; an increase in the tariff rate increases r, 
which decreases home production of good 2 and the rest 
of the world uses its capital more intensively, causing 
an improvement in the terms of lending (p). Therefore, 
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the optimal tariff is higher for such a country when 
foreign investment is considered. Similarly, the 
optimal tariff is higher for a debtor country which also 
imports the capital-intensive good. Batra (1973) 
extends Gehrels' analysis in the presence of a wage 
differential. Boadway, et. (1973) analyze a model 
where there is an exported good, an imported good, and a 
public good. Using this model, they derive the optimal 
tariffs (for both imports and exports), and show that 
the tariff formulae are the same as the traditional 
optimal tariff, but since domestic taxes or public goods 
may affect the demand elasticities, the actual rates may 
be different from the traditional model. They also 
consider the second-best condition of non-taxable 
domestic goods. For the import tariff T1 and the export 
tariff T2, the following equations are derived from a 
modified Langrangean: 
1+Tj = pd+l/nj) + (ki/Pi)(drj/dXj) (1.6) 
I+T2 = p(l+l/n2) + (k2/P2)(dr2/dX2) (1.7) 
where p is the Langrangean multiplier from the balance 
of trade constraint, Pj and P2 are the foreign prices 
(measured in domestic currency) of the importable and 
exportable good respectively, n^ and n2 are respectively 
the elasticities of excess demand for the exportable and 
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importable good, and k2 are the langrangean 
multipliers from the constraints that the two goods 
and Xg are not domestically taxable, and rj and T2 are 
the producer's price of the two goods. In this model, 
they show that the optimal import tariff is lower, and 
the optimal export tariff is higher than in the 
traditional case, since tariffs are now the only source 
of revenue available to provide the public goods. 
Fishelson and Flatters (1975) added to the optimal 
tariff literature by introducing uncertainty into the 
model. They consider a model with a linear import 
supply curve, and a linear domestic demand curve. They 
first analyze a demand curve with a stochastic intercept 
term, and they conclude that an optimal tariff is 
superior to an optimal quota in that the welfare loss is 
lower with the tariff. Although they do not formally 
evaluate the case, they reach the same conclusion if the 
slope of the demand curve is stochastic. When they 
consider a linear model with a deterministic demand 
curve, and a stochastic intercept on the supply curve; 
or a stochastic slope on the supply curve ; they conclude 
that if the supply curve of imports is elastic, then a 
tariff is preferred to a quota. However, if the supply 
curve is inelastic, then a quota may (but not 
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necessarily will) be preferred to a tariff. Young 
(1979) extends the analysis and provides a more formal 
proof that an optimal quota can be preferred to an 
optimal tariff under uncertainty. The basic conclusion 
is that it is possible for an optimal quota to be 
preferred to an optimal tariff under uncertainty, if the 
degree of uncertainty of the supply elasticity (linear 
curves) is sufficiently small. 
Tower (1975) was one of the first writers to relax 
the assumption of no retaliation. Using the reaction 
curves derived by Johnson (1953), Tower considers the 
optimal tariff from the perspective of country 1, when 
country 1 assumes that country 2 will automatically 
place an optimal tariff, based on the "current" trade 
situation. That is, in Stackelberg terminology, country 
1 is a leader, and country 2 is a follower. Therefore, 
a reaction curve can be generated based on the action 
taken by country 1 that country 2 will always follow. 
Essentially, country 2's reaction curve is the loci of 
the "points of tangency between one of 2's trade 
indifference curves and the given tariff-distorted offer 
curve of 1." For example, if both countries use tariffs 
and country one is a Stackelberg leader and country two 
is a follower, point A in Figure 1.2 represents the 
18 
optimal tariff for country one to apply. Tower's basic 
conclusion is that "either the leader or the follower 
may be better off than in free-trade equilibrium." He 
also notes that a Stackelberg leader will always prefer 
an optimal tariff to an optimal quota. 
To date, the most general relaxation of the 
non-retaliation assumption is the case considered by 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976). They also deal with a 
case in which country 1 is a leader, and country 2 is a 
follower. Essentially, they are interested in the 
optimal tariff that country one should impose, given 
that there is some probability that country two may 
impose an import quota in the next period. In other 
words, country one "knows" that country two will 
retaliate, but country two does not know that country 
one chooses a tariff based on two's reactions. Note 
that country one only knows the probability function 
that describes two's reaction. That is, they do not 
know exactly how two will respond. The import quota is 
a fixed level denoted E'. There is a known probability 
function P(E) that this quota will be imposed in the 
second period. This function is assumed to be convex in 
E; which means that as the level of exports gets larger, 
the probability that the quota will be imposed increases 
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at an increasing rate. Domestic production 
possibilities are denoted by F(Xj,X2). Welfare is 
measured by a social welfare function U(Cj,C2). Welfare 
in the next period is denoted Uq if the quota is 
imposed, and Un if the quota is not imposed. 
Mathematically, the problem is solved by maximizing a 
two-period, two-good social utility function for country 
one with respect to the level of exports, and the two 
commodities; subject to the domestic transformation 
constraint. That is, country one maximizes 
U(X^-E,X2+rE) + p(UqP(E)+Un(l-P(E))) (1.8) 
subject to F(Xj,X2) = 0. Carrying out the maximization 
yields 
U^/Ug = (r+r'E)-(p(Un-Uq)/U2) P'(E). (1.9) 
In these equations, and U2 are the first order 
derivatives with respect to goods X^ and X2, r is the 
terms of trade function, P(E) is the probability of a 
quota E' being imposed next period, and p is the one 
period discount factor. The first term of the optimal 
tariff in equation (1.9) reduces to the traditional 
no-retaliation optimal tariff. The second term is the 
discounted expected loss in welfare converted to 
numeraire terms. That is, if an additional unit of 
export takes place in period one, the probability of a 
20 
quota being imposed increases by P'(E). Thus, the 
second term is the expected loss in welfare "at the 
margin." 
The basic conclusion is that when such a 
probabilistic quota situation exists, country one needs 
to impose a tariff in order to maximize its utility 
level. As would be expected, if a quota is imposed, 
country one is better off if they impose a tariff. 
Also, free trade (no quota and no tariff) is preferred 
to the situation where country two imposes the quota and 
one does not retaliate. Finally, there is no way to 
determine if country one is better off with the quota 
and the retaliatory tariff or free trade. Note that 
although a degree of uncertainty has been introduced, 
these conclusions are not markedly different from the 
analysis in the previous literature. 
It is fairly straight-forward to extend the 
analysis to a model in which production levels (Xj and 
^2) are fixed in the first period. That is, production 
cannot be modified at all in the second period, which 
economically means that a quota in period two could be 
very harmful if production was too high in period one. 
In this case, the optimal policy is to impose a 
consumption tax (tariff) in the first period to take 
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advantage of the monopoly power in trade, and a 
production tariff/subsidy in the first period to account 
for the fixed production possibility. In the second 
period, it is only necessary to impose a tariff if the 
quota is imposed. 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan also extend the analysis to 
a steady-state, infinite time horizon problem. In this 
case, once the quota is imposed, it is never removed. 
Secondly, the probability of it being imposed is only 
dependent on the level of exports in the previous 
period, and this probability is independent of time. 
Because of these assumptions, the results are very 
similar to those generated for the two period case. 
However, it is interesting to examine the levels of 
welfare that are generated from three cases. The 
highest level of welfare is achieved with free trade (no 
quota and no tariff). The lowest level of welfare (for 
country one) occurs when country two imposes the quota, 
and country one does not impose a retaliatory tariff. 
Falling between these two cases is the situation where 
country two does impose the quota, and one retaliates 
and imposes the optimal tariff. 
This work provided an interesting analysis of 
uncertainty, where country one does not completely know 
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how country two will respond. However, country two 
still incorrectly believes that its quota will not 
affect country one's tariff decision. Also, no attempt 
is made to explain where the probability function comes 
from, and why it remains unchanged in the infinite time 
horizon case. That is, after imposing a tariff in a 
period, each country will be able to examine the other's 
reaction, and reformulate their own beliefs about how 
the other country actually responds. 
Kemp and Ohta (1978) add some generalizations to 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan's analysis by considering an 
infinite horizon, continuous time model. They note that 
the Bhagwati-Srinivasan case assumes 
that the probability that the quota will be 
imposed at any point of time, given that it 
has not been imposed already, depends only on 
the rate of flow of exports at that time. 
This is the polar case of a perishable, 
non-storable commodity. 
Hence, besides offering a more formal analysis of that 
case, Kemp and Ohta consider the other polar case of a 
durable good, "with the probability depending on 
cumulative exports." 
Kuga (1973) extended the earlier naive model of 
Johnson (1953), into a multi-country, multi-commodity 
framework. Each country has "import tariff policies 
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that are country-wise and commodity-wise 
discriminative," while maximizing a social welfare 
function. Tariff revenue received is assumed to be 
redistributed to the private sector in à lump-sum 
fashion. Kuga then establishes the appropriate 
conditions (including a finite number of tariff options) 
necessary to apply the "Nash theory of noncooperative 
game to show the existence of mixed policy equilibrium." 
He then generates a two-commodity, three-country example 
to demonstrate the outcome of various tariff strategies 
on welfare levels in the three countries. 
Otani (1980) takes a slightly different approach to 
the optimal tariff problem. Government agents in his 
model have incomplete information on domestic 
preferences, and on supply (both domestic and 
world—e.g. foreign tariff rates). Using the 
information available, government agents 
choose a system of tariffs to maximize the 
estimated preferences of domestic consumers 
with a constraint on an estimated availability 
of commodities. 
This multi-commodity, multi-country model also assumes 
that any action by a government agent is based on the 
assumption that current tariff vectors will remain 
constant. That is, the agent assumes that no other 
countries will retaliate. Otani uses this model to show 
24 
the general existence of a world equilibrium. 
Tower, Sheer, and Baas, (1978) use numerical 
techniques to demonstrate "what happens to domestic and 
foreign welfare" under four different retaliation 
assumptions—ranging from the no retaliation assumption 
to a Stackelberg leader/follower assumption. They use 
an equivalent variation measure to evaluate the effects 
of different tariff rates under different elasticities 
of demand for imports. 
25 
CHAPTER 2. NOTES ON PERFECT FORESIGHT 
All of the literature on optimal tariffs has relied 
on restrictive assumptions about the nature of 
retaliation (or lack of it). That is, at least one 
country maintains a naive assumption that the other will 
not retaliate—regardless of any "actual" change in 
tariffs. The essential question that remains to be 
answered is to determine if there are any solutions in 
which all countries involved know how the others will 
respond. In other words, both countries are aware that 
their actions will elicit a reaction from the other 
country. 
A more precise way to state the problem is to 
consider that when each country attempts to maximize 
welfare (with respect to its tariff rate), there may be 
some change in the other country's tariff rate. Using 
this method, each country can then consider their 
optimal tariff rate as a function of what they believe 
is the other country's reaction. This reaction could be 
called the conjectural variation. The existing 
literature is a special case of this approach in that 
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the anticipated reaction for at least one of the 
countries is zero. For the Cournot case, both countries 
assume that there will be no reaction. In the 
leader/follower case, the follower assumes there will be 
no reaction, and the leader then considers the 
follower's calculated response to the leader's tariff to 
derive its optimal tariff. In the Bhagwatti-Srinivasan 
case, the follower's reaction (as perceived by the 
leader) is a probabalistic function of the leader's 
exports. 
Given that each country's optimal tariff is a 
function of the other's perceived reaction, there are 
essentially two ways to solve for the optimal tariff. 
First, each country could possess perfect foresight. 
That is, the perceived response function is equivalent 
to the actual response function. Second, relaxing this 
assumption slightly, each country may possess only 
imperfect foresight where the perceived response 
function is not necessarily known with certainty. That 
is, a country's belief could be wrong. Then, there 
must be a way to correct this belief. 
The basic model assumes that there are two 
countries, trading two commodities. Each country 
produces, consumes and trades each commodity under free 
27 
trade initially. Welfare is a function of consumption 
of each good, and government agents attempt to maximize 
some Social Welfare function. Production takes place on 
a Product Transformation curve that is negatively sloped 
and strictly concave. Each country's domestic economy 
is organized in a competitive manner, whereas the 
balance of goods and services is always in equilibrium. 
Finally, tariff revenue is redistributed to consumers in 
the form of additional income. 
To keep the problem to a manageable level, consider 
a two-good, two-country world, where, in a partial 
equilibrium setting, welfare can be approximated by the 
consumer surplus or producer surplus generated from the 
excess supply and demand curves for one of the 
commodities. By maximizing the appropriate surplus, the 
optimal tariff for each country can be found as a 
function of the perceived reaction of the other country. 
The focus of the problem now is to define the 
manner in which each country perceives the other's 
reaction. First, consider the possiblity that each 
country possesses perfect foresight. Before beginning, 
it is important to understand what is meant by the term 
perfect foresight. Heuristically, a country can be said 
to possess perfect foresight if, for any given tariff 
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that it could place, the country knows what tariff the 
other country will impose. On the surface, the 
condition could be expressed mathematically by noting 
that the level of the other country's tariff must equal 
the expected value of the tariff, which is the familiar 
Nash equilibrium condition. However, such a statement 
does not explain where their actual tariff comes from. 
That is, for perfect foresight to exist—for a country 
to know what tariff the other will impose—that country 
must know the process that the other uses to determine 
what tariff it will impose. In essence, to have perfect 
foresight, a country must know the reaction function of 
the other country; where the reaction function is an 
expression of the tariff that the second country will 
impose for any given tariff of the first country. One 
possible approach to the problem is to hypothesize that 
each country actually follows some reaction function 
dependent on the other country's tariff. Each country 
also knows the other's reaction, and knows that the 
other country also possesses perfect foresight. One 
possible approach to the problem is shown by Bresnahan 
(1981), in which he attempts to find the solution to a 
similar problem posed for the case of a duopoly. 
The Bresnahan paper treats a case of two producers. 
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where each is cognizant that a change in their output 
will affect the output of the other firm which will 
create a secondary affect on the market price, which 
affects the first firm's profits. Hence, when firm i 
attempts to maximize profits, it considers the impact of 
the change in output of firm j. That is, 
differentiating the profit function for the first firm 
entails the inclusion of a reaction term. Using an 
inverse demand function, and assuming perfect 
substitutes, profit for firm one can be written as 
P^l = Pi(q)qi - Cj(qj) (2.1) 
where q = q^+qg. The first-order condition for profit 
maximization is 
0 = qi[%Pi(qi,q2)/3qi + 3Pi(qi,q2)/9q2 • 
^^2(91)] ~ 3c2(qj)/3qj (2.2) 
Note that r^g is the conjectural variation. That is, 
^12 is what country one believes will be country two's 
response to a change in q^. Bresnahan then notes that 
(2.2) can be solved for q^ as a function of q2 and 1^2" 
Call this function pj. A similar process will yield q2 
as a function of q^ and r2i, denoted p2, where r2i is 
two's perception of how country one will react to 
changes in qg. He then defines a perfect foresight 
condition, which he calls a consistent conjectures 
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equilibrium (CCE), as a point in output space (q2*,q2*) such 
that q^* = P]^(q2*) and q2* = which is the Nash 
equilibrium. Further, to be consistent, the conjectural 
variations must equal what he calls the actual variation. 
Or, in his notation, 
'^12(QI) ~ dp2(qj)/dq]^ (2.3) 
^^1^92) ~ dp2(q2)/dq2 (2.4) 
which must hold for all (q]^,q2) within an epsilon 
neighborhood of the Nash equilibrium (qj*,q2*)' The 
left-hand side in equations (2.3) and (2.4) are the 
conjectural variations, and the right-hand sides are what 
Bresnahan (1981) considers to be the actual variations. To 
solve the systen), he contends that if the reaction functions 
are constrained to be polynomials, then they must be linear, 
hence, the second derivatives of and r2i must be zero. 
As a result, when equation (2.2) is solved for q^ = 
Pl(q2>ri2^» can be differentiated with respect to q2» and 
di^l2/dq2 will drop out, making the solution much easier. 
Bresnahan then proposes to substitute the resulting formulas 
• for dpg/dq^ and dpj/dq2 into the pj and P2 functions to 
determine the equilibrium (qj*,q2*)« Before analyzing some 
of the objections to his analysis, it should be pointed out 
that the method is easily transferred to the 
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international trade situation of two large countries. 
Let Tj and T2 be the tariffs imposed by countries 
one and two respectively. If each country is maximizing 
some welfare function (or a relevant surplus), then the 
welfare is a function with respect to Tj and T2, or 
"1 = UlfTl'Tz') (2.5) 
U2 = U2^'^l'»^2^ (2.6) 
where Tg' is one's belief about what equilibrium T2 will 
be, and Tj* is defined symmetrically. Differentiating 
(2.3) and (2.6) to determine the first-order conditions 
yields 
0 = 3Uj/3Tj + (9Ui/3T2)ri2 (2.7) 
0 = aU2/8T2 + (aU2/aTi)r2i (2.8) 
Now, equations (2.7) and (2.8) can be solved 
respectively to yield 
= Gi(T2',ri2) (2.9) 
T2 = G2(Ti',r2i) (2.10) 
Which means that Tj can be expressed as a function of 
^2 and country one's conjectural variation about 
and a similar statement can be made about T2. 
Without imposing rationality at the moment, consider an 
example that Bresnahan presents. That is, it seems 
reasonable to ask if the Cournot assumption could 
represent perfect foresight equilibrium. 
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In the Cournot case, both countries are behaving as 
followers in the sense that they accept the other 
country's tariff as given, and do not expect it to 
change as they change their own tariff. Therefore, both 
^^21 identically equal to zero. Imposing 
this constraint would mean that equations (2.9) and 
(2,10) would reduce to the following 
As long as neither country alters its belief, equations 
(2.11) and (2.12) will represent the true reactions of 
country one and two respectively to changes in the 
other's tariff. 
To illustrate the process, consider a two-country, 
two-good world in which country one exports good X. P 
represents the price of good X in country one. Country 
one imposes a specific export tariff (Tj) on good X, and 
country two imposes a specific import tariff (Tg) on 
good X. Assume that the excess demand curve for X can 
be described by the general function 
and the general excess supply curve in free trade can be 
described by 
^1 ~ Gi(T2) 
T2 = G2(Tj )  
(2 .11 )  
( 2 . 1 2 )  
D: Qd = Qd(P+Tj+T2) (2.13) 
S: Qs = Qs(P) (2.14) 
33 
Equilibrium quantity is found by simultaneously solving 
equations (2.13) and (2.14) for Q, yielding 
Qe = Qe(Tj,T2) (2.15) 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the net producers' surplus 
(exclusive of tariff revenue) accruing to country one 
(from the exports only) can be represented by area A. 
Similarly, the net consumers' surplus accruing to 
country two from the imports can be represented by area 
C. Bj and Bg represent the tariff revenue received by 
countries one and two respectively. The objective of 
country one is to maximize the sum of areas A and B^ 
with respect to Tj. Country two attempts to maximize 
the sum of C and B^ with respect to !£. Let Uj equal 
A+B., then U, can be written as 
Pe 
Uj = TiQ8(P) + /Q8(P)dP (2.16) 
*1 
Differentiating with respect to Tj, yields 
dUj/dTj = Qe + TjS'dPe/dTj + QedPe/dTj (2.17) 
Where dPe/dTj comes from the equilibrium condition 
Qs(P) = Qd(P+Tj+T2) (2.18) 
Totally differentiating each side yields 
dPe = D'/(S'-D') (dTj+dTj) (2.19) 
Letting the the conjectural variation that is 
held by country one, substituting dPe/dT^ into equation 
(2.17), and solving for Tj yields 
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P 
a 2 
b 1 
Pe+T,+T 2 
Pe 
1 
1 
Q Qe 
Figure 2.1 
Producer and consumer surplus from trade 
The intercepts come from assuming linear supply and demand curves; 
S; Q = a^ + b^P 
D; Q = 32 - b^CP+T^Tg) 
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-QeCS'+D'r,,) 
T, = (2.20) 
S'D'Cl+rig) 
Similarly, from the perspective of country two, for Ug 
equal to C plus Bg, 
^2 
U, = ToQdCPe+Ti+To) + / Qd(P)dP (2.21) 
Pe+Ti+Tg 
This equation can similarly be solved for Tg 
Qe(D'+S'r„]) 
Tg = (2.22) 
S'D'd+rji) 
Consider a simplified case where both the excess 
supply and demand curves are linear. Then, 
S: Q = aj + bjP (2.23) 
D: Q = ag + bgXP+Ti+Tg) (2.24) 
Note that to obtain a downward sloping demand curve and 
a positive slope on the supply curve, the following 
relations must hold: a^ < 0, b^ > 0, a2 > 0, b2 < 0, 
^2^1 - a^bg > 0. Substituting (2.23) into (2.20), and 
solving for T^ yields 
(ûjbi—aibo+bobiTn')(bi+borio) 
T^ = (2.25) 
b2bj(b2~b]^(2+rj2^^ 
Similarly, 
^*2bl"8ibn+bobiTi')(bo+biroi) 
To = (2.26) 
b2bj(b2-b2(2+r2i)) 
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where Tg' represents one's  belief about the level of 
two's tariff, and ' represents two's belief about the 
level of one's tariff. 
As noted above, the Cournot case implies that 
^12 ~ ^ 21 ~ That is, neither country expects changes 
in their tariff to affect the other country's tariff. 
Substituting zero into equations (2.25) and (2.26) for 
^22 and X21 yields 
(ambi—aib o+b ob1 To') 
Ti = . _ (2.27) 
and 
(a«b1~b1bo+bob1Ti') 
Tg = (2.28) 
Note that equation (2.27) defines the best for 
country one to impose for any value of its belief about 
'^2^' Equation (2.28) symmetrically defines the optimal 
^2 for any belief T^'. Now, as is well-known, there is 
a Nash equilibrium where = T^' and T2 = ^2'' which is 
the familiar equilibrium after the tariff wars run their 
course. At this Cournot equilibrium point, equation 
(2.27) will represent one's reaction curve with respect 
to a tariff imposed by country two. The important point 
to note is that if equation (2.27) is differentiated 
with respect to Tg, the result is non-zero.. This result 
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is in conflict with the original belief by country two 
that rg^ is identically equal to zero. That is, it 
contradicts the belief that country one would not 
respond to changes in two's tariff. Hence, perfect 
foresight does not prevail at the Cournot equilibrium. 
Bresnahan arrives at a similar conclusion for the 
duopoly case in that the Cournot assumption does not 
yield a consistent conjectures equilibrium. 
In a similar manner, it can be shown that a 
Stackelberg leader/follower case can be represented as a 
perfect foresight case. If country one believes that 
country two is a follower, then they believe that 
equation (2.25) holds, and that country two uses the 
maximization process described above to find the optimal 
tariff, hence, equation (2.26) should hold. Country one 
further believes that country two thinks it is a 
follower, therefore, from one's perspective, rg^ should 
be zero, which means that equation (2.26) reduces to 
^ ^ obi—aibi+bobiTi) 
Tg = (2.29) 
hi(bi-2b2) 
Differentiation of (2.29) yields the reaction of country 
two to changes in one's tariff, or 
ri2 = dTg/dTi = bg/fbi-Zbg) (2.30) 
Equation (2.30) is the reaction of country two that 
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country one expects will occur. Substituting this 
result and the value for Tg from (2.26) into equation 
(2.25) will yield the optimal tariff for country one to 
impose, which will be a function solely of the 
parameters of the model. 
If country two actually considers itself to be a 
follower, and assumes that country one is a leader, then 
two really will behave in the fashion indicated in 
(2.30), and will be imposed as described. As a 
result, it is true that at the equilibrium point, the 
change in the believed reaction function Tj with respect 
to Tg will be zero—as indicated in the reduced version 
of equation (2.25). 
However, what happens if country two does not want 
to be a follower? That is, given that country one is a 
leader and two is a follower, the above analysis defines 
the optimal tariff for each country to impose. A more 
general approach would allow each country to maximize 
its utility regardless of its current status as a leader 
or follower, and that status (if any) should follow as a 
result of the maximization process. 
Judging by the above examples, it would seem to be 
a straightforward exercise to extend the analysis to 
both sides possessing perfect foresight, while still 
39 
maximizing their respective surplus. If the analysis 
were extended along the lines proposed by Bresnahan (1981), 
equations (2.25) and (2.26) would be said to define the 
true reaction functions of each country, and the true 
responses could then be evaluated from these functions. 
The most general approach would be to claim that and 
rg^ are first derivatives of unknown reaction functions, 
and that in perfect foresight, we could assign equations 
(2.25) and (2.26) to be equal to the unknown functions. 
The result would be a system of two non-linear partial 
differential equations. Presumably this system could be 
solved for the two unknown functions, and once they are 
found, the equilibrium values for Tj and T2 could be 
found. However, such an approach would err in the same 
way that Bresnahan's approach errs. 
Consider a system such as the one outlined above, 
or one such as Bresnahan's. Assume for the moment that 
a point of perfect foresight exists, and that the system 
is at that point. At this point, each agent knows the 
behavior of the other, and this belief is consistent 
with what actually occurs. Now, the problem is in part 
a conceptual one. If the system is at a point of 
perfect foresight, it cannot be anywhere else. 
Therefore, it is irrelevant to conjecture about how the 
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other agent would respond to a change in one's tariff, 
since no other tariff can possibly exist. Further, it 
is not methodologically legitimate to differentiate 
with respect to Tg, since country one initially assumes 
that Tg is endogenous. 
In Bresnahan's notation, there may be an epsilon 
neighborhood about the Nash equilibrium, but the 
solution can be only at the Nash equilibrium. To 
demonstrate this claim, consider a simple application of 
proof by contradiction. First, for perfect foresight to 
exist, both countries must know what tariff the other 
will impose. Begin with both countries in equilibrium. 
Now, assume that country one imposes a different tariff. 
This tariff creates a contradiction since country two, 
possessing perfect foresight, believes that one's tariff 
will be the original tariff. As a result, it is 
irrelevant to consider what would happen if one country 
changed its tariff, since it is beyond its power to do 
so. 
Although it is still possible for each country to 
possess a belief about how the other might react to a 
change in their tariff, there is no way to compare this 
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belief to the "true" response, since there is no "true" 
response. Basically, if analysis of a perfect foresight 
case is possible, it must be conducted only at an 
equilibrium point. It would be possible to consider 
changes in the underlying parameters, either in 
comparative statics, or over time, but in general, these 
changes will not aid in the understanding of the 
reaction of one country to another's tariff, especially 
since both tariff rates are functions of all the 
parameters. 
Before examining a method to generate perfect 
foresight solutions, it is necessary to consider some 
general characteristics of perfect foresight. The most 
important point is that there can be an infinite number 
of such solutions. That is, consider a Stackelberg 
leader/follower situation in which the leader country 
offers two choices to country two. One is a prohibitive 
tariff (by one) with no trade—which will be imposed if 
country two imposes any sort of tariff. The second 
offer is for country one to impose a tariff slightly 
less than prohibitive, and no tariff by country two. 
From the perspective of either country, the latter offer 
is better than the first. If two agrees to this trade, 
a fortiori, perfect foresight exists. Clearly, any 
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number of such points could exist. Of course, this type 
of process does not show where such offers originate, 
nor does it provide a means for determining the optimal 
choice for country one to offer. The important point is 
that there can be an infinite number of perfect 
foresight solutions, and there does not have to be a 
relationship between them. In particular, there does 
not have to be a continuous relationship between tariffs 
in perfect foresight. (In fact, continuity is extremely 
unlikely.) That is, given the proper assumptions, any 
tariff combination could represent a perfect foresight 
solution. Hence, the objective is transformed into a 
search for an optimization process that will generate 
solutions that also represent perfect foresight. 
An approach that shows more promise than that used 
by Bresnahan (1981) is to start from a point of 
imperfect information. That is, consider that each 
country attempts to maximize a Social Welfare function. 
For country one, this function is dependent on their own 
tariff, and what they believe will be country two's 
tariff. In a dynamic sense, one's belief could be a 
function of the tariff levels that country two imposed 
in previous periods. Country two could have similar 
beliefs with respect to country one's tariffs. Unlike 
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the Cournot model, where the belief is held regardless 
of the outcome in the next round, the beliefs could be 
revised with each successive round. The result is that 
each country will possess a function that they believe 
describes the reaction of the other country. If this 
process of adaptive expectations continues long enough, 
and the process is stable, then eventually, each country 
should learn the "true" reaction of each country. That 
is, at some point, the beliefs about the reaction 
functions will remain the same, and will be accurate. 
Finally, consider a similar process where country 
one believes that country two will retaliate in a manner 
that is dependent on the tariffs imposed by both 
countries in the last period. Now, consider what 
happens when both countries possess perfect foresight. 
That is, country one knows exactly what tariff country 
two will impose because they each know that the other 
maximizes welfare subject to a belief function. Hence, 
the objective is to find belief functions that are 
consistent in perfect foresight. This search is the 
foundation of the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3. PERFECT FORESIGHT FOR TWO COUNTRIES 
Introduction 
In order to fully understand the retaliation 
process, it is necessary to explicitly include time in 
the model. That is, a model of foresight must express 
what beliefs each country holds at a given period in 
time. The variable (t) will be an index of time. Since 
each country is economically rational, they will both be 
attempting to maximize some measure of welfare from 
trade. Since the process will be modelled over time, 
each country is attempting to maximize the discounted 
present value of their welfare measure. The importing 
country will be called country one, and will impose a 
tariff Tj^(t) at time (t). Country two will be the 
exporting country, and will impose tariff TgCt) at time 
(t). 
Consider the maximization problem from the 
perspective of country one. Note that in any time 
period (t), the welfare that country one gains from 
trade is a function of both tariffs: T^(t) and TgCt). 
Since T^(t) is under the direct control of country one, 
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it is called the control variable. Observe that at time 
(t), from the standpoint of country one, TgCt) has 
already been imposed, and is exogenous. Hence, it 
defines the state of the system. That is, once TgCt) is 
set, it imposes limits on the welfare values that 
country one can achieve. For this reason, TgCt) is 
called the state variable. 
If Tg is fixed for all time periods, the problem 
reduces to a simple optimization over time with respect 
to the single control variable. Of course, this type of 
problem is just another manifestation of Cournot 
behavior. Since the goal is to introduce foresight, 
country one must have a belief about how country two 
will impose its next tariff. That is, country one 
believes that the next period tariff by two (TgCt+l)) is 
a function of current tariffs Tj(t) and TgCt). For the 
moment, it is not important where this belief comes 
from. The objective is to maximize the discounted sum 
of welfare, subject to this belief. Since there is no 
artificial limit to the number of time periods, there is 
an infinite time horizon. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider solutions that are in steady state equilibrium. 
That is, equilibrium exists when each country imposes 
the same tariff in the current period (t) that it 
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imposed in the last period. Fortunately, there is a 
technique for solving maximization problems of this 
type. The problem precisely fits the conditions of a 
dynamic programming model. For a given belief function 
(g), the maximization process will yield an optimal 
tariff for country one to impose that is a function 
solely of TgCt). Since the belief function expresses 
as a function of last period's tariffs, the 
optimal tariff can be written as a function of the two 
last period tariffs. 
The key is to observe that a similar maximization 
process is carried out by country two. That is, they 
maximize discounted producer surplus, subject to a 
belief about how country one's next period tariff is 
affected by the current tariffs. This process also 
generates an optimal tariff for country two that is a 
function of the tariffs imposed by both countries in the 
last period. 
Summarizing, country one starts with a belief about 
two's tariff 
TgCt+l) = g[Ti(t),T2(t)] (3.1) 
which generates an optimal tariff as a function of the 
last period tariffs 
Tl*(t) = h*[Ti(t-l),T2(t-l)] (3.2) 
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Likewise, two starts with a belief about one's tariff 
Tj(t+1) = h[ri(t),T2(t)] (3.3) 
and derives an optimal tariff 
T2*(t) = g*[Ti(t-l),T2(t-l)l (3.4) 
The important point is that if h = h* and g = g*, then 
the belief functions are equivalent to the "actual" 
responses, and perfect foresight exists, and the problem 
is solved. Hence, in order to generate perfect 
foresight solutions, it is necessary to find two 
functions (g and h) such that these relationships hold. 
Essentially, it is just a matter of solving a system of 
first order difference equations. 
A good treatment of the dynamic control theory 
which underlies the solution presented here can be found 
in Kamien and Schwartz (1981). Selten and Marschak 
(1978) also commented on more general conditions of such 
models, but their analysis rests on "kinked" reaction 
curves. Radner (1980) examined naive cartel 
participants using trigger strategies in a finite game. 
In the particular linear solution considered, there 
are five solutions which can be classified according to 
the reaction of one country to a change in tariffs by 
the second. First, the Cournot solution appears, in 
which neither country reacts to a change in 
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the other's tariff. Second, there is a full retaliation 
solution, where any change in a tariff by one country is 
met with an equal change by the other country. There 
are two sub-cases to this solution, one set of tariffs 
is lower than the Cournot case (which will be a subsidy 
if the discount factor is greater than one-half), and 
one set is higher. The final solution arises from a 
reaction in which an increase in a tariff is met by an 
equal decrease in the other country's tariff. Again, 
there are two sub-cases, with one tariff lower than 
Cournot, and one higher. 
Description of Model 
Mathematically, from the viewpoint of country one, 
the process can be reduced to two equations. First, 
there is one's belief function 
TgCt+l) = g[Tj(t),T2(t)] (3.5) 
Secondly, dynamic programming results show that the 
discounted present value of welfare can be written in 
two parts as 
KtlgCt)] = (Ui[T*(t), T2(t)] 
+ 6K(T2(t+l))) (3.6) 
In equation (3.6), represents some measure of utility 
accruing to country one in time period t, and ô is a 
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discount factor. The first term is the welfare accruing 
to the current period, and the second term is an 
iterative way to denote the present value of all future 
states. The right hand side of (3.6) is maximized with 
respect to the control variable (Tj(t)). Hence, K is 
determined solely by the state variable TgCt). In 
economic terms, K represents the maximum present value 
of any possible state. Observe that the problem has now 
been expressed as a dynamic programming problem with an 
infinite horizon. 
Before continuing, it should be noted that some 
minor restrictions are necessary to justify equation 
(3.6). First, the utility function must by bounded for 
finite tariffs. Second, there must be some combination 
of tariffs that generates zero utility. If the problem 
is expressed to consider utility from trade alone, these 
two restrictions are fairly easily met, with no-trade 
fulfilling the second restriction. Finally, it must be 
possible to reach the state (T2(t)) that generates 
no-trade in a finite number of steps. This last 
restriction imposes some minor constraints on the 
reaction belief expressed in equation (3.5), but 
economically, they do not matter, since the problem only 
makes sense if no-trade is allowed as a possible 
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solution. In general, for a given belief, this system 
can be solved to find a reaction function for country 
one. 
In the general problem, it is possible to show that 
the Cournot solution is also a perfect foresight 
solution. To prove this point, it is necessary to show 
that if both countries believe that the other will not 
change its tariff, then there is some point in tariff 
space at which it is true that neither country changes 
its tariff. Recall that, in general terms, one's 
initial belief about two (denoted g) led to an optimal 
tariff for one. The process could be written 
functionally as 
Ti*(t) = g{f[Tj(t-l),T2(t-l)]} - (3.7) 
To see that the Cournot solution is possible, let 
country one assume that two follows a Cournot reaction, 
that is, 
dT2(t)/dTj(t-l) = 0 = dT2(t)/dT2(t-l) (3.8) 
In other words, country one believes that country t-./o's 
tariff is a constant value that does not depend on the 
tariffs imposed in the last period. Using thj first 
equality, will cause 
dTj*(t)/dTi(t-l) = 0 (3.9) 
by the composite function rule and equation (3.7). Now, 
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if country two possesses perfect foresight, they will 
know equation (3.9) is true, which, by the composite 
function rule again, will lead to their optimal tariff 
rule such that 
dT2*(t)/dTi(t-l) = 0 (3.10) 
Since this equation represents two's true reaction, 
country one's initial belief was correct. A similar 
argument shows that dT2(t)/dT2(t-l) = 0 is also a 
perfect foresight solution. Hence, the Cournot solution 
is also a perfect foresight solution. Economically, it 
means that at that point, neither country expects the 
other country to change its tariff, and neither country 
does move. 
It is important to note that the Cournot solution 
is not always a perfect foresight solution. The above 
case is special in that the utility function is 
dependent on the current period tariffs only. For 
example, if adjustment costs are added, the utility 
function will include a Tj(t-l) variable. Consequently, 
the value function K must now include the same term, and 
the optimal tariff Tj*(t) will be a function of Tj(t-l) 
both directly and indirectly (by composite function). 
Hence, the above perfect foresight analysis will fail 
because the true reactions will not be zero. 
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Note that the way the problem is posed, the only 
interesting solutions occur when the system is in steady 
state equilibrium. It might be possible to consider 
other solutions, however, these solutions would be 
artificial in that they would depend heavily on the 
external conditions imposed to generate them. For 
example, the game could be posed within a finite time 
period, but the solutions would depend on the starting 
point, and the length of time; or on some other ending 
criterion. Whether or not any of the original solutions 
remain would depend on whether or not the new conditions 
exclude them. 
Specific Solution 
To show that the procedure posed above has 
meaningful solutions, consider a more specific model. 
In the following example, country one shall be assumed 
to be exporting some good, and imposing a specific 
export tariff (Tj^(t)) on some good, while country two 
imposes a specific import tariff (Tgft)) on the same 
good. The simplifying assumption of linear supply and 
demand curves is added to the conventional assumption of 
pure competition in the domestic markets. Additionally, 
both countries have the same bargaining power. That is, 
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each country will equally bear the burden of an increase 
in tariffs (in terms of prices). In particular, this 
assumption means that the elasticity of two's export 
supply curve must equal the elasticity of one's import 
demand curve. This assumption may seem unreasonably 
restrictive, but it is actually the most relevant case. 
That is, the process could be modelled with different 
elasticities, but then the results would seem to depend 
more on which country is less able to respond to tariff 
pressures. Hence, to remove extraneous considerations, 
this paper consider two countries that are equals. When 
dealing with linear excess supply and demand curves, 
this assumption has the effect of imposing symmetry in 
the two maximization processes that must be undertaken 
by the two countries. Net producer surplus and net 
consumer surplus, along with the respective tariff 
revenues (which are assumed to be redistributed as 
income), are taken as the approximation to utility for 
countries one and two respectively. Expressing these 
assumptions algebraically, 
Qs = aj+bjP (3.11) 
Qd = a2-bi(P+Ti(t)+T2(t)) (3.12) 
Equations (3.11) and (3.12) can be solved simultaneously 
for equilibrium price and quantity as functions of Tj(t) 
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and TgCt). The graphics of the problem are presented in 
figure 2,1. As shown in Appendix A, with linear demand 
and supply curves, the utility approximations are 
quadratic functions in Tj(t) and T2(t). Hence, equation 
(3.6) can be expressed as 
KLTgCt)] = max{ [a+bTj^(t)+cT2(t)+gTj^(t)T2(t) 
+ eTj(t)^ + fTgCt)^] 
+ 6K[T2(t+l)]} (3.13) 
Equation (3.5) representing one's belief about two's 
reaction will be linear, and can be written as 
T2(t+1) = y + aTj(t) + gT2(t) (3.14) 
The details of the solution are left to Appendix A, 
following the procedure outlined above. Note that the 
symmetry assumption implies that the actual reaction 
functions of each country must be symmetric with respect 
to Tj^(t) and T2(t), so that once the coefficients are 
found for country one, the symmetry condition 
automatically generates the coefficients for country 
two's reaction function. The linearity conditions 
create a quadratic description of the value function K, 
such that 
K[T2(t)] = BoT2(t) + BiT2(t)2 (3.15) 
Now, It can be shown that the optimal value of Tj(t) is 
given by 
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Tl(t)* = (-H-Sy)/Y - a(S/Y)Ti(t-l) 
- 3(S/Y)T2(t-l) (3.16) 
Observe that the optimal tariff is indeed a function of 
both last period tariffs. H, S, Y are substituted for 
convenience and are defined as 
The basic results can be summarized in three cases, 
grouped according to the slope of the reaction function. 
There is the Cournot case with no retaliation; a full 
retaliation case, where an increase in a tariff is 
matched by an equal increase by the other country; and 
an opposite retaliation case, where an increase in a 
tariff is met with a decrease by the other country. 
First, consider the Cournot case, given by setting 
a = 3  = 0;  
H = b + UÔBQ + 2aôyB2 
S = g + 2aô3Bj 
Y = 2e + 2a2ôBj^ 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
= bj/ô 
®0 ~ -(ai+a2)/3 
a = 3 = 0  
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
M = (aj+a2)/2bi (1/2) 
Tj* = Tg* 
Equation (3.22) means that country two imposes a 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
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constant tariff (equal to p) that does not depend on the 
tariffs in the last period. The second case is 
generated by setting a = g, and S = -Y, and results in 
the following values: 
= bi/2 (3.25) 
Bq = -(aj+a2)/2 (3.26) 
ct = 6 = ± /I/Id" (3.27) 
U = (aj+a2)/2bi (1-a) (3.28) 
The steady state tariffs are 
Tj* = Tg* = y/(l-2a) (3.29) 
Note that the main reaction (a  = g)  means that if 
country one increases its tariff, country two will 
retaliate by increasing its tariff in the next period. 
Observe that the optimal tariffs for both countries are 
equal (because of the symmetry imposed above). Also, 
the tariffs are dependent on the constant term in the 
belief function (y), and the reaction by the other 
country (a). The final case, generated by a = -3 and 
S = Y results in 
Bj = bi/2 (3.30) 
Bq = -(ai+a2)/2 (l/(l+a<S))  (3.31) 
a = -g = ± /I/4(S (3.32) 
W = (ai+a2)/2bi (l/2(l+a6)) (3.33) 
Tj* = T2* = y (3.34) 
57 
In this case, as shown by (3.32), if country one 
increases its tariff, country two retaliates by 
decreasing its tariff in the next period. Once again, 
the optimal tariffs, from equations (3.33) and (3.34), 
depend on the reaction of the "other" country. 
Before evaluating the results on a case-by-case 
basis, two additional points need to be considered. The 
first question is whether or not the results are maximum 
points and not minimum ones. Maximizing the right hand 
side of equation (3.6) with respect to T^(t) generated 
the optimal tariff by solving 
0 = b + gTgOk) + 2eTj(t) 
•taô{BQ + 2Bj [y+aTj(t) +3T2(t)]} (3.35) 
The second derivative of this equation with respect to 
T^Ct) yields a second order condition (SOC) such that 
SOC = 2e + 2a^6B^ 
or, substituting in the proper values 
SOC = bj(a^6 - 3/4), (3.36) 
which is negative for all the cases, so the points are 
indeed maximum values. 
The second question to consider is whether or not a 
given solution is stable. That is, the solutions for 
the optimal tariffs as outlined in equation (3.16) 
represent a system of two linear difference equations. 
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The steady state solution of them is important, but it 
is also constructive to ask whether or not the system 
would return to that particular value if it was 
perturbed by some amount. Writing the equations in 
their symmetric form yields 
TjCt)* = U + oiTj(t-l) + BTgCt-l) (3.37) 
TgCt)* = y + GTi(t-l) + oTgCt-l) (3.38) 
Solutions can be postulated to be in the form 
Ti(t) = Am': (3.39) 
T2(t) = Bm*: (3.40) 
Using these two equations, and simplifying equations 
(3.37) and (3.38) by writing the homogenous system in 
matrix form yields 
% 1 FAI TO 
(3.41) 
In order for a non-trivial solution to exist, the 
coefficient matrix must be singular, hence, its 
determinant must be equal to zero. That is, 
(3.42) 
The two roots to the characteristic equation are then 
m-3 -a  À "d 
j-Cl m—3 B 0  
(m-g)^ - = 0 
m. = a + g 
m. 
-a + 3 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
For a solution to be stable, the absolute value of the 
roots must be less than one. The question of stability 
will be considered further under each of the cases. 
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Case 1 : Cournot 
Consider the easier case first. That is, the 
Cournot case has been covered fairly extensively in the 
literature, so all that needs to be done is to determine 
if there are any new twists introduced in the perfect 
foresight analysis. First, putting a = 0 into equation 
(3.36) indicates that the solution is indeed a maximum. 
Second, from equations (3.43) and (3.44), both roots of 
the characteristic equation are equal to zero. Which 
means that the system is degenerate. The equilibrium 
quantity can be solved for 
Qe = (ai+a2)/4 (3.45) 
Notice that none of the results for this case are 
dependent on the discount factor (ô). Also, observe 
that dTj*/dT2 = 0 in equilibrium. That is, there is no 
response to a change in either country's tariff. Of 
course, in equilibrium, there is also no incentive to 
change. Hence, it is fairly clear that perfect 
foresight does hold, in that neither country expects the 
other to alter its tariff, and neither country does 
change. 
In order to compare the various cases, it is useful 
to examine the level of welfare in the current period. 
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Observe first that Tj must equal !£ in equilibrium 
(denoted T*); and using equation (3.12), welfare for 
either country can be expressed as 
U = a + (b+c)T* + (g+e+f)T*2 (3.46) 
Using the definitions of the variables (a-g) yields 
U = a - bj/2 T*^ (3.47) 
For the Cournot case, it reduces easily to 
U = [(ai+a2)^/8bi] (1 - 1/4) (3.48) 
which is greater than zero. 
The optimal tariffs—from equations (3.23) and 
(3.24)—are composed of two parts: a first term, and a 
multiplier coefficient (1/2). It is clear from 
equations (3.28) and (3.33) that the tariffs in the 
other cases can be written in a similar manner; 
differing only in the multiplier. These multipliers are 
graphed against the discount factor in Figure 3.1. In 
this case, the graph is a straight line, halfway between 
free trade and no trade. (It is halfway because of the 
equal elasticities.) Note that welfare also consists of 
two parts: a first term based on the constant term from 
the welfare function, and a multiplier coefficient 
(1-1/4). For later reference, the last term of this 
coefficient (1/4) is graphed against the discount factor 
in Figure 3.2. Since it is not dependent on 6, it is 
not very interesting, but it does provide a reference 
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for the other cases. It will be shown that welfare in 
the other cases can be written in a similar fashion. 
Note that a coefficient of one represents no trade, and 
zero is free trade. 
Full Retaliation 
In this case, where a =6 and S=-Y, there are two 
sub-cases, created by the positive and negative square 
roots used in finding a and g. Since the optimal 
tariffs are dependent on a and 3 , it is necessary to 
consider both cases separately in most respects. 
However, for both cases, the second order condition is 
fulfilled—since it is dependent on the square of a . 
Also, by using the absolute value, it can be seen that, 
in each sub-case, one root is greater than one, and one 
is degenerate, implying that the solution is a saddle 
point, which means that if the initial belief is 
"correct," the solution will "converge" to this point. 
Case 2 ; subsidv sub-case 
Using the positive square roots as the first 
sub-case, the optimal tariffs from equation (3.29) are 
^  Sj+ao) W  2 S  —1) 
Ti* = (3.49) 
2 b i  ( / 2 1 s  -2) 
One way to understand the results is to examine the 
values for the tariffs (denoted T*) for differing values 
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of the discount factor (6). When 6 is equal to one, 
T* = -(ai+a2)/(2bi/z ) (3.50) 
From the equilibrium quantity under free trade, SLj^+a2 
must be greater than zero. Since bj is the slope of the 
supply curve it is positive as well, so the optimal 
tariffs in this case are negative, or subsidies as they 
are usually called. For a discount factor equal to 
one-half, T* is equal to zero—which is free trade. In 
the limiting case, as the discount factor goes to zero, 
the optimal tariffs approach 
T* 4. (aj+a2)/4bi (3.51) 
which is the equilibrium tariff level for the Cournot 
case. It is clear that as the discount factor decreases 
from one to zero, the optimal tariffs monotonically 
increase from a subsidy to no tariff to the Cournot 
tariff level. The coefficients demonstrating these 
values are displayed in figure 3.1. 
Why does one-half yield the free-trade solution? 
The easiest way to answer the question is to split 
welfare into two categories: current welfare, and 
discounted future welfare. In steady state equilibrium, 
the actual welfare received in any period is a constant, 
so the discounted future value is merely an infinite 
geometric series. When the discount factor is one-half. 
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the discounted sum is exactly equal to the welfare 
received in the current period. That is, when each 
country expects the other to retaliate in full, the 
optimal tariff will be zero if society places an equal 
weight on current welfare and future welfare. However, 
if society values future consumption more, then each 
country will employ subsidies to ensure that the other 
country will not impose a tariff in the future 
(diminishing the more important welfare). If society 
values current more than future welfare, then each 
country will impose a tariff now, in order to increase 
current welfare—even if it carries a cost of lower 
welfare in the future. 
For this case, the steady state value of current 
welfare is given by 
U = (ai+agi^/Sb, • 
(1 - (l-a)2/(l-2a)2) (3.52) 
First note that this value is always positive. 
Secondly, to determine how welfare changes as the 
discount factor varies, differentiate (3.52) with 
respect to a. The result is 
dU/da = -(ai+82)2/4bi (1-a) (l-2a)"^ (3.53) 
Since da/dg is always negative, current welfare 
increases when the discount factor increases if the 
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discount factor is between zero and one-half. If the 
discount factor is between one-half and one, and 
increasing, current welfare will decrease. Note that 
when the discount factor increases between one-half and 
one, the total welfare level increases, but welfare 
accruing from the current period decreases. These 
relationships are presented in figure 3.2, based on the 
coefficient multiplier (the right half of (3.52)). This 
multiplier first decreases to zero and then rises to 
one-half, which means that welfare increases to its free 
trade level, and then drops below the Cournot level. 
Case 3 ; tariff sub-case 
The second sub-case is very similar to the first 
sub-case. All of the formulas are the same, but it uses 
the negative roots for a and g. As a result, the 
optimal tariffs are 
(a,+an)(/2S +1) 
T* = (3.54) 
2bi (/Z? +2) 
When the discount factor is one, 
T* = (ai+a2)/2bi/2 (3.55) 
As the discount factor approaches zero, in the limit, 
T* -V (aj+a2)/4bi (3.56) 
Note that equation (3.56) is the Cournot equilibrium 
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level again. 
In this second sub-case, as society's value of 
future consumption decreases; the discount factor goes 
from one to zero; the optimal tariff monotonically 
decreases from a finite level (trade still exists) to 
the Cournot tariff. Observe that the current welfare in 
this case is also given by equation (3.52), and it is 
always positive. In order to examine the change in 
current welfare with respect to changes in the discount 
factor, recall equation (3.53). Since da/d6 is now 
positive, the sign of dK/d<S is now negative. Which 
means that as the discount factor increases, the steady 
state level of tariffs increases, causing the current 
welfare to decrease. 
The primary difference between the sub-cases is the 
response of one country to its tariff in the last 
period. In the first case, if either country increased 
its tariff in the last period, both countries will 
increase their tariff in the current period, and there 
will be a continuous increase in the tariffs. In the 
second sub-case, an oscillating pattern will develop, 
because if country one increased its tariff in period 
one, both countries will decrease their tariff in period 
two; and increase them in period three, etcetera. 
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Opposite Retaliation 
In the last case, where a = -3 and S = Y, there are 
also two sub-cases, created by the positive and negative 
square roots in finding a and g. Note that the second 
order condition is fulfilled for both sub-cases, since 
it depends on the square of a. Also, the system is a 
saddle point, since one root is zero, and the absolute 
value of the other is greater than one. 
Case 4 
The steady state tariff in this case is 
Tj* = Tg* = (ai+agi/Zbi l/2(l+a6) (3.57) 
Note that this value is always positive. Further, when 
the discount factor equals one, 
T* = (aj+a2)/2bi (1/3) (3.58) 
Once again, as the discount factor approaches zero, the 
optimal tariff monotonically approaches the Coumot 
tariff level. Notice in Figure 3.1 that this tariff is 
between the Cournot tariff and the full retaliation 
(case 2) tariff, but it is always a tariff (never a 
sub s idy ). 
The current level of utility is found by 
U = (aj+a2)^/8bj * 1 - l/4(Ha6)^) (3.59) 
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It is clear that as the discount factor increases, the 
optimal tariff decreases, and the level of welfare 
increases. Note in figure 3.2 that when the case 2 
tariff becomes a subsidy, the corresponding welfare 
drops, until, for values of the discount factor close to 
one, case 4 has the highest level of welfare. 
Case ^  
The formulas for this sub-case are very similar to 
those in the last one, since the only difference is the 
sign of the a. term. Once again, as the discount factor 
approaches zero, the optimal tariffs approach the 
Cournot level. However, as the discount factor 
approaches one, the tariffs monotonically increase until 
they reach the no-trade level when the discount factor 
is equal to one (the discount rate is zero). Of course, 
as the tariffs increase, the welfare (from trade) 
decreases to zero. As shown in figures 3.2 and 3.2, 
this case clearly has the highest tariffs, and 
consequently, the lowest level of welfare. 
Comparison of Cases 
For this model, there are now three classes of 
perfect foresight solutions. Since two of them have two 
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sub-cases, there are five possible solutions. In order 
to compare the solutions, it is necessary to observe the 
values of the tariffs for different values of the 
discount factor. Note that all of the tariff formulas 
have a common structure—a common constant term that is 
multiplied by some fraction. This fraction is dependent 
only on the discount factor in all the cases. The 
current welfare in the cases can be written in a similar 
manner, where the multiplier is one minus the square of 
the tariff multiplier. The multipliers for the tariffs 
are plotted against the discount factor in figure 3.1, 
and the current welfare multipliers are displayed in 
figure 3.2, where a lower line represents a higher 
tariff. Note that the values all converge to the 
Cournot case when the discount factor is zero (the 
future has no value). The tariffs are essentially 
ranked from low to high as follows: full retaliation 
(subsidy sub-case); opposite retaliation (low tariff); 
Cournot; full retaliation (tariff); opposite retaliation 
(high tariff). The two highest tariffs cross when the 
discount factor equals (3/2 - /2); as do the 
corresponding welfare values. The subsidy-case welfare 
crosses the Cournot level when the discount factor 
equals (8/9). It crosses the opposite retaliation (low 
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tariff) welfare when the discount factor solves 
0 = 26% - (19+2/2)d + 16 (3.60) 
It should be noted that the ranking of the welfares must 
be approached with caution. That is, a country does not 
really choose which solution should exist based on which 
one carries higher welfare. There are five solutions to 
the problem that are consistent with perfect foresight. 
Each one arises from a different set of beliefs about 
how both countries will react to changes in tariffs. 
Each one is independent of the other solution, in that 
the countries cannot "move" from one solution to 
another. Any movement from an equilibrium position 
results in an unstable situation, and imperfect 
foresight. The ranking of the welfares is relevant only 
because it shows which set of beliefs is the most 
beneficial. For example, if the prevailing solution was 
Cournot, and a country wanted to increase its welfare by 
moving to the full retaliation case, the only way to get 
there is to change the beliefs of both countries about 
how the other will react. 
Since the Cournot case has already been described, 
consider the full retaliation case. Note that there are 
actually two reactions of interest in the model. The 
reaction by the other country to a tariff change, and 
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the response by the first country to its own tariff 
change in the last period. In this case, both reactions 
are in the same direction. In the first sub-case, if a 
country raises its tariff, both effects will cause the 
two countries to match the other's tariff increase 
indefinitely. Hence, at equilibrium, neither country 
has an incentive to change the tariff, for fear of the 
ultimate retaliation. In the second sub-case, both 
tariffs will again move together (up in the same time 
period, or down in the same time period). However, 
since a country's reaction to the foreign change is 
negative, it is not fear of retaliation that causes an 
equilibrium point. Rather, a country knows that if it 
increases its tariff, the other country will merely 
decrease its tariff by the same amount to negate the 
change; hence, eliminating any possible gain in consumer 
or producer surplus. Possibly the reason this 
equilibrium tariff level is higher than the first is 
because the country with the higher tariff will get more 
tariff revenue, and tariff revenue is now a more 
significant factor since changes in consumer and 
producer surplus are negated. The reaction of a country 
to changes in its tariff from the previous period causes 
the tariff level (out of equilibrium) to oscillate. 
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This oscillation seems to provide a moderating influence 
on the equilibrium tariff level. 
In the opposite retaliation case, in a given time 
period, the two tariffs are always moving in opposite 
directions. For the first sub-case, a response to a 
change in the other country's tariff is in the same 
direction. That is, there is the fear of retaliation 
again. Note that since the response to changes in one's 
own tariff is negative, an oscillation pattern develops 
again—distorting the discounted welfare sum, and 
causing a slightly higher tariff than the first case of 
the full retaliation. This oscillation is removed in 
the second sub-case, and the opposite retaliation is 
much clearer. Here, if a country raises its tariff, the 
other will decrease its tariff, and this process will 
continue indefinitely. In this sub-case, if society's 
social discount rate is zero, the equilibrium tariffs 
are high enough to completely eliminate trade. 
Conclusion 
The primary focus of this chapter has been to show 
that it is possible to find an optimal tariff for which 
both countries possess perfect foresight. The Cournot 
equilibrium represents perfect foresight since both 
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countries believe that neither will change their tariff. 
Two solutions also arise when both countries believe 
that the other will exactly match a tariff increase or 
decrease. Basically a "strong-arm" situation. The 
final solutions come about when both countries believe 
that any tariff increase will be met with an equal 
decrease by the other country—negating the change, and 
merely redistributing the tariff revenue. Depending on 
the discount factor involved, the full retaliation case 
can lead to free trade (or even a subsidy); and the 
opposite retaliation can lead to a no-trade solution. 
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CHAPTER 4. M EXPORTERS AND N IMPORTERS 
One of the drawbacks of the optimal tariff with 
perfect foresight analysis presented in Chapter 3 is 
that to solve the system, both countries had to have 
equal economic power against the other. That is, the 
absolute values of the supply and demand curves had to 
be equal. Because of the nature of the equations, it is 
not possible to relax this assumption without 
introducing an infinite number of solutions. However, 
it is possible to introduce more than two countries into 
the analysis. Any one country will have the same 
economic power (slope of supply or demand curve) against 
any other single country. However, if there is more 
than one exporter (m in general terms) or more than one 
importer (n in general terms), the economic position of 
any one exporter or importer has now changed. Hence, it 
is possible to consider what happens in a market as one 
country loses its market share. 
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Introduction 
In general terms, the problem is solved by noting 
that from the perspective of an importing country, there 
are three classes of countries. Country A is one 
importing country, group B is the other (n-1) importing 
countries, and group C consists of the (m) exporting 
countries. Since all countries in a particular class 
behave the same, the problem is very similar to the one 
posed in chapter 3. Country A attempts to maximize the 
discounted present value of a welfare measure, subject 
to a belief about how the other two types of countries 
will respond. This belief can be denoted by expressing 
the next period tariffs by the other two countries (B 
and C) as function of the current period tariffs imposed 
by B and C. Solving this maximization problem in an 
infinite time horizon leads to an optimal tariff for 
country A that is a function of the last period tariffs. 
The other two types of countries use a similar process 
to generate their optimal tariffs as functions of the 
last period tariffs. Now, for perfect foresight to 
exist, all countries must know the "true" coefficients 
of these various response functions. Since all 
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countries know how the others make their decisions, the 
coefficients can be found by equating the original 
"estimates" with the "true" values. This process yields 
of system of equations that can be solved, yielding 
equilibrium tariffs. 
Since any one country must have the same individual 
power as any other, the slope of any excess supply or 
demand curve must be of the same magnitude—call it b^. 
Initially, consider the problem from the perspective of 
one importer (country A). The objective is to maximize 
some measure of welfare. Here, consumers' surplus and 
redistributed tariff revenue will suffice as 
approximations. Price (P) is expressed as world price, 
and the demand for imports within country A can be 
expressed in linear terms as 
Qa = aj - bi(P+Ta) (4.1) 
All of the other (n-1) importers are assumed to be 
identical to this country, so their total demand can be 
written 
Qb = (n-l)aj - (n-l)bi(P+Tb) (4.2) 
Finally, all of the (m) exporters are identical, so the 
amount they are willing to supply can be expressed as 
Qc = (mJag + (m)bi(P-Tc) (4.3) 
The details of the mathematics are left to Appendix B, 
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but by adding equations (4.1) and (4.2) to get world 
demand, and equating it to the world supply equation 
(4.3), it is possible to solve for equilibrium world 
price. Once world price is found, equation (4.1) yields 
equilibrium quantity demanded by country A: 
Qa = m(aj+a2)/(m+n) + bj/(m+n) . 
[(l-m-n)Ta + (n-l)Tb - mTc] (4.4) 
The welfare approximation can be written in terms of 
equilibrium quantity, and the expression in equation 
(4.4) can be substituted to generate an expression for 
welfare that is a quadratic function of the three tariff 
rates (Ta, Tb, Tc): 
Ua = [m/(m+n)]^ 
+ [m(m+n)-2mb2(m+n-l)] (a2+a2)/(m+n)^ Ta 
+ 2mb2(n-l)(a2+a2)/(m+n)^ Tb 
- 2m^b2(aj+a2)/(m+n)^ Tc 
+ (n-l)bj/(m+n)^ TaTb 
- mb2/(m+n)^ TaTc 
- m(n-l)b2^/(m+n)^ TbTc 
- (m+n-l)(m+n+l)b2/2(m+n)^ Ta^ 
+ (n-l)2bi/2(m+n)2 Tb^ 
+ m^bj/2(m+n)^ Tc^ (4.5) 
To simplify notation, it can be written as 
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Ua = a + bTa + cTb + dTc + eTaTb + fTaTc 
+ gTbTc + hTa^ + iTb^ + jTc^ (4.6) 
It is also possible to go through a similar process 
for an exporting country. Because the same value of bj 
is used as the slope of the excess supply curve, the 
results are symmetric to equation (4.5). Which means 
that once results have been found for one type of 
country, the results for the other class follow 
immediately by symmetry. This symmetry is not only 
convenient, but necessary. Without the symmetry, there 
is an infinite number of solutions, which means that the 
analysis could provide no substantive conclusions. 
The framework of the solution is a basic dynamic 
programming model. That is, country A is attempting to 
maximize the welfare function presented in equation 
(4.6), but it is necessary to consider the reactions of 
the other two countries. Hence, initially, country A 
believes that the future tariffs of the two countries 
can be expressed as 
Tbt^j = y + aTa^ + gTc^ (4.7) 
Tc^+l " E + yTa^ + 8Tc^ (4.8) 
For the moment, the reaction coefficients in these two 
equations are assumed to be known. Note that Tb^ does 
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not appear explicitly in either equation. This omission 
is deliberate, since Tb^ appears implicitly through Ta^. 
To include it again, would be superfluous, and would 
generate interdependent equations in the system. 
To solve the system, it is necessary to find a 
function (K) that solves 
K(Tbj.,Tc^.) = Ua(Ta*,Tbj.,Tc^) 
+ aK(Tbt+i,TCt+i) (4.9) 
The function K represents the sum of welfare from the 
current period, plus welfare from future periods 
discounted by the factor (6). Since the welfare 
function is quadratic, K will also be quadratic, and can 
be written 
K(Tbt,Tct) = BTb^ + CTCj. + DTbJ 
+ ETbj,TCj. + FTc^ (4.10) 
When no confusion will result, the (t) subscript will be 
dropped. The problem can now be solved by finding the 
values of the coefficients of K that will maximize the 
welfare function, subject to the reaction beliefs 
presented in equations (4.7) and (4.8). 
The first step in solving the system is to 
differentiate (4.10) with respect to Ta^, set the result 
equal to zero, and solve for the optimal Ta^ as a 
function of Tb^ and Tc^. The values for the 
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coefficients of K can be found by differentiating (4.10) 
with respect to Tb^ and Tcj.. The result is that if the 
reaction coefficients (from equations (4.7) and (4.8)) 
are known, the optimal Ta^^^ can be expressed as a 
function of Ta^ and Tc^; or as a function of Tbj. and 
Tc^. That is, 
Ta^^j = -(H+)je+zS)/Y — (ae+ySj/Y Ta^ 
-(3e+0S)/Y TCj. (4.11) 
Or, 
Tat^l = (e-0H/Y) - (0e/Y) Tb^ 
+ (-8S/Y + y) Tc^ (4.12) 
Where S, Y, and H have been defined for notational 
convenience as 
S = f + 6&(2aD+YE) + 0ô(aE+2YF) (4.13) 
Y = 2h + aiS(2aD+YE) + Y<5(aE+2YF) (4.14) 
H = b + 6 (otB+YC) + pô(2aD+YE) 
+ eô(aE+2YF) (4.15) 
Because of the symmetry noted above, these country A 
reaction functions are symmetric to the reaction 
functions presented in equations (4.7) and (4.8). 
Hence, if there is perfect foresight, the coefficients 
of these equations must by equal to the coefficients in 
equations (4.7) and (4.8) respectively. Which means 
that 
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E = -(H + ue + eS)/Y (4.16) 
Y = -(ge + eS)/Y (4.17) 
0 = -(ae + y S ) / Y  (4.18) 
jj = E + a.H/e (4.19) 
a = -0e/Y (4.20) 
3 - -0S/Y + Y (4.21) 
There are now eleven nonlinear equations and eleven 
variables: B, C, D, E, F, p, a, 3, ej Y> and 0. The 
system can be split into two sets. The first consists 
of the variables D, E, F, a, B, y> ^nd 0; and seven 
equations that contain only those variables. The second 
set consists of the other four variables. Given 
equilibrium values for variables in the first set, it is 
possible to analytically solve the second set of 
equations. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
analytically solve the first set of equations. However, 
two important relationships can be derived from the 
first set: 
The plus/minus depends on the sign used in the square 
root from equation (4.22). Note that equation (4.22) is 
very similar to the results in chapter 3. In that case, 
the reaction by the exporter was equal to (or opposite 
Y^ = (0 + a)2 (4.22) 
B = + 20 (4.23) 
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of) the reaction by the importer. In this case; as 
perceived by an importer; the reaction by the exporter 
is equal to (or opposite of) the sum of the reactions by 
the two sets of importers. Second, it appears from 
equation (4.23) that the "other" importing countries 
will respond twice as much to a change in the exporting 
countries's tariffs. However, recall that Tb^ does not 
appear explicitly in equations (4.7) and (4.8), a fact 
which is taken into account by the two multiplier. 
One of the important conclusions that can be 
reached from equations (4.16) to (4.20) is that the 
Cournot case is a solution to the system. It is also 
possible to examime what happens to individual solutions 
as the number of exporters (m) or importers (n) becomes 
infinite. Note that, including the Cournot solution, 
there are five possible solutions to the equations; as 
indicated by the squared terms in equation (4.22). To 
examine specific results in most of the cases, it is 
necessary to generate numerical solutions to the 
equations. However, the Cournot case is easier, so it 
is considered first. 
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Cournot 
The Cournot case uses the assumption that a change 
in a tariff by any one country is met by no change in 
tariffs by the other countries. In terms of this model, 
it means that the four main reaction coefficients in 
equations (4.7) and (4.8) (a, 3, y, and e) are all equal 
to zero. Substituting these values into the system 
equations yields the steady state level of tariff 
T* = y = -b/(e + f + 2h) (4.24) 
Because of the symmetry involved, any individual country 
will impose this same level of tariff, which reduces to 
(m(m+n) - 2mb,(m+n-l)) (ai+ao) 
T* = ^ (4.25) 
(m+n+l)(m+n)bj 
Other than its historical significance, the reason the 
Cournot case is important is because it can be compared 
to the other cases. For the smallest case that can be 
considered, one exporter, and two importers, the optimal 
Cournot tariff is 
T* = (3-4bp(ai+a2)/(12bi) (4.26) 
Since the slope (bj) is positive, the sign of the tariff 
hinges on the magnitude of bj. If the curves are 
relatively steep, then the tariff will be greater than 
zero. Otherwise, the optimal tariff will be negative 
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(usually called a subsidy). As the number of importers 
increases (to infinity), the optimal Cournot tariff will 
approach zero. Which means that as an importing country 
becomes smaller and smaller relative to the world 
market, it loses control over price, and its ability to 
gain by changing prices is eliminated, so the country 
ultimately will impose no tariff or subsidy. This 
result is similar to the traditional statement that the 
optimal tariff for a small country is zero because it 
cannot influence the terms of trade. 
From the viewpoint of the seller, it is important 
to note that the world price approaches the intercept 
value on the individual demand curves. That is, for an 
individual importing country, the price approaches its 
maximum level, and the level of imports approaches zero. 
Since there are a large number of buyers, the exporter 
can sell all it wants to at that price, so there is no 
incentive to grant a subsidy. Imposing a tariff is 
fruitless since price cannot go any higher, so the 
optimal value is no tariff. 
On the other hand, holding the number of importers 
constant, and increasing the number of exporters, the 
optimal Cournot tariff approaches 
T* = (l-2bj)(ai+a2)/bi (4.27) 
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Note that this tariff is non-zero. In fact, for most 
cases, it is a subsidy. To see why both exporters and 
importers would grant a subsidy, it is necessary to 
examine the world price level: 
Pw = -ag/b^ + T* (4.28) 
If there were no tariffs or subsidies, the prevailing 
price would be just the first term in equation (4.28), 
which is the lowest possible price on the exporters' 
supply schedules. That is, without international 
intervention, the few importing countries would pay the 
lowest possible price to obtain a minimal amount from 
any individual supplier. It is worthwhile for the 
exporting countries to grant subsidies on their exports. 
Also, the importing countries will find it beneficial to 
subsidize imports to increase the returns to consumers. 
Numerical Solutions 
As noted above, it does not seem possible to solve 
the system of equations analytically, hence, a numerical 
process was used to generate solutions for several 
different cases. The technique seemed especially 
relevant since individual solutions are not very 
important. It is much more meaningful to observe how 
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the solutions—in terms of the reaction coefficients and 
the tariffs—change as the number of countries changes. 
The above equations involving the reaction 
coefficients (ot, g, y> 8 ), and the coefficients of the 
state equation (D-F) were first reduced analytically as 
far as possible. The result is a reduction to the point 
where they behave as a system dependent on two 
variables: a and 0. That is, for given estimates of 
those two variables, two new estimates follow 
immediately from the equations. Once the first set of 
equations is solved, the values can be substituted into 
the analytical results for the second set. The problem 
is that the first set of reduced equations is very 
unstable numerically, in that poor guesses for the 
initial estimates can prevent the numerical system from 
converging. Therefore, to solve the system, it is 
necessary to use a successive bisection technique. 
Although it converges slowly, at least it converges, 
given "good" initial estimates. The second problem is 
that it is necessary to solve for two variables 
simultaneously. 
The process of solving such a system can be 
outlined by examining two variables (X and Y). The 
basic computer algorithm starts with initial estimates 
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for both variables. and X2 are respectively the low 
and high values of X. Similarly, Yj and Y2 are the high 
values of Y. The equations to be solved are expressed 
so that equilibrium values of X and Y will yield two 
zeros. That is, f(X*,Y*) = (0,0). The initial values 
of X and Y have to be given such that f(X^,Y^) ' 
fCXg.Y^) = (-a,b). That is, for both of the Y 
endpoints, the functional value corresponding to the X 
term must change signs between the two X points. Hence, 
there must be an X value between them such that f(X*,Y^^) 
= (0,b). This X value can be found by successively 
bisecting the interval, until the interval containing 
the zero is acceptably small. Further, the initial Y 
points have to have the property that f(Xj*,Y2^) " 
f(X2*,Y2) = (0,-b). That is, once the zeros for X have 
been found, the corresponding functional values for the 
Y term must change sign between the two values for Y. 
Hence, there will be a point between the two Y estimates 
such that f(X*,Y*) = 0. This point can be found by 
successively bisecting the Y interval. Of course, every 
time a new Y value is calculated, it is necessary to use 
the bisection technique to generate a new estimate for 
the X zero corresponding to that Y value. By decreasing 
the size of the final interval, the X* and Y* estimates 
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can be as close to the actual values as desired. At 
least, up to the limit of the accuracy of the machine 
due to round-off errors. In most cases, the limit 
specified was five decimal places. Once the entire 
system was solved, the values were substitued back into 
the original equations to check the error. The results 
were also tested in sixteen digit precision in case 
round-off error was large, but there were no significant 
changes in the results. For the most part, the results 
appear accurate to four decimal places. 
As pointed out above, because of the square terms, 
there are four basic solutions to the equations (not 
counting Cournot). One set of solutions is found for 
each value of the square root term found in calculating 
y. Recall that y is the response of the exporting 
countries to changes in the tariffs of the importing 
countries. The two cases within each set are found by 
choosing different starting values for the two intial 
estimates (a  and e). That is, for the first set, y  =  
(a+6) which is greater than zero. Hence, importing and 
exporting countries both increase their tariffs if the 
other type of country increased their tariff in the last 
period. For the second set, the same equality holds, 
but it is now less than zero. That is, if the importing 
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countries raise their tariffs, the exporting countries 
will tend to lower their tariffs. The importing 
countries will respond in a similar fashion to changes 
in tariffs by the exporting countries. The other sign 
of the square root term is used to compute the third 
set, so y = -(a+9) and it is greater than zero. In this 
case, an increase in tariffs by the importing countries 
results in a decrease in tariffs by the exporting 
countries, but an increase in tariffs by the exporting 
countries results in an increase in tariffs by the 
importing countries. The y term is less than zero in 
the fourth set, and just the opposite reactions occur. 
It is possible to analytically observe what happens 
to the reaction coefficients as more and more exporters 
and importers enter the market, and the number of buyers 
and sellers approaches infinity. As the number of 
importers (n) approaches infinity, all of the 
coefficients of the welfare function approach zero 
except 
h = -bj/2 (4.29) 
i = b^/2 (4.30) 
Since (e) approaches zero; and (Y) does not; the 
reaction coefficient ct must approach zero. That is, 
importers no longer respond to changes in tariffs by 
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other importers. Hence, 
= 0^ (4.31) 
(4.32) 
In a similar fashion, holding the number of buyers 
constant, consider what happens as the number of 
exporters is increased. In this case, all the welfare 
coefficients are zero, except 
a = (ai + a2)^/(2bj) (4.33) 
b = -2b2(aj + 32) (4.34) 
d = -2b2(a2 + a2) (4.35) 
h = -bj/2 (4.36) 
3 = bj/Z (4.37) 
Before considering the numerical results for each of the 
cases, it is interesting to examine the reactions and 
tariffs in the limit as n and m approach infinity. 
Holding the number of exporters constant, and 
increasing the number of importers, the following 
results follow fairly easily from observing that x 
approaches zero: 
/ = 0^ (4.38) 
p = ± 28 (4.39) 
Y = -1 (4.40) 
= 1 (4.41) 
Using the definitions of Y and F, it is possible to show 
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that 
462bj(Y'^) + 6bj(Y^) + (1-bp = 0 (4.42) 
Equation (4,42) can be used to solve for four values of 
y. Two of these are imaginary, and the other two help 
create the four possible cases. 
As the number of exporters increases, holding (n) 
constant, the values for p are solutions to 
= (bj - l)/(26bj) (4.43) 
As both (m) and (n) approach infinity, y is determined 
from 
= (bj - l)/(8bi) (4.44) 
To observe what happens to the optimal tariffs, it is 
necessary to determine how H and e react to changes in m 
and n. Note that as ra approaches zero, M approaches e, 
and B and H approach zero. To solve for e, the general 
procedure is to use the equations defining H and C. 
However, for the case where (n) approaches infinity, the 
two equations are not independent, so the tariff values 
cannot be found analytically. 
On the other hand, it is possible to decide what 
occurs when the number of exporters increases. For the 
first two cases, where y and 0 are equal, the equations 
defining C and H can be reduced to 
e  =  -d / (26YF)  (4.45) 
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Also, reducing the equation that defines the tariffs 
yields 
T* = e/(l - ly) (4.46) 
For the last two cases, where y is the negative of 0, 
the equations reduce to 
E = -d(l + 2ôy)/(2<SyF) (4.47) 
Note that in the last two cases, the sign of ( e )  may 
depend on the magnitude of the discount factor. The 
optimal tariff is found by 
T* = -e/(l + 2y) (4.48) 
Finally, note that as both (m) and (n) increase, d 
approaches zero, so e must approach zero. That is, 
regardless of the particular case, as the number of 
importers and exporters increases, the optimal tariffs 
approach zero. Which means that as the number of 
participants in the market increases, the market 
approaches free trade. 
Another important question that arises is whether 
or not the solutions are stable. That is, if the system 
is perturbed by some small amount, it would be nice to 
know if the system will return to any of the particular 
solutions, or merely diverge. In general terms, the 
three main reaction functions can be considered as a 
system of difference equations: 
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(4.49) 
(4.50) 
(4.51) 
Tat^l = y + «Tb^ + 3Tc^ 
Ta^+l = E + GTa^ + yTc^ 
Tc^+l = e + yTaj. + GTc^ 
To test for stability of the system, it is necessary to 
consider the solution to the homogeneous system. 
Consider that the solutions (for the tariffs) must be of 
the form 
Ta^. = Ak*" (4.52) 
Tb^ = Bk*^ (4.53) 
TCj. = Ck (4.54) 
Hence, the system can be written in matrix notation as 
-k 
Y 
0 Y " A 0 
a g B = 0 
o
 
CD
 
C 0 
(4.55) 
For any non-trivial solutions to exist, the determinant 
of the coefficient matrix must be equal to zero, hence 
0 = a(6-k)^ - (4.56) 
For a not equal to zero, equation (4.56) implies that 
there are two roots to the characteristic equation: 
k = 0 + Y (4.57) 
k = 0 - Y (4.58) 
Note that the reaction terms relating countries A and B 
are not important in this case. There is one more 
characteristic root that can be found from a slightly 
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a g -k A 0 
Y 0 ( -k) B 0 
jk a g C 0 
different statement of the problem. The root comes from 
the system of equations that can be expressed as 
(4.59) 
The characteristic roots must solve 
0 = + (a^~aY ~ g8)k - (a^0 + (4.60) 
Since this system is not independent of the first, and 
as the numerical results indicate, one of these roots is 
always equal to one of the roots in the first case, and 
the other is distinct. Hence, there are three roots to 
the complete system. In the limits, only the first two 
are necessary to demonstrate stability. That is, since 
Y and 0 are related such that they are either equal or 
opposite, one of the roots from equations (4.57) and 
(4.58) must be zero. That is, the system is partially 
degenerate. Secondly, unless the absolute value of p is 
less than one-half, the system will be degenerate. As 
will be seen within the analysis of the individual 
cases, the lowest limiting value is one-half. Hence, 
the system is unstable in the limit. It is also fairly 
clear that the system is unstable for each of the 
individual cases, as will be shown numerically. 
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Case 1 
The first case is based on setting y  equal to the 
sum of a and 0. The value for 3 is then equal to twice 
that of 6. These values are all greater than zero. For 
the most part, the solutions to the system evaluated as 
the number of importers and exporters increases are more 
important than any individual solutions. However, it is 
easier to coordinate the two solutions by considering a 
base system. Most of the numerical results were 
generated with the following data: 
aj = 10 (4.61) 
a2 = -5 (4.62) 
bj = 2 (4.63) 
& = 0.5 (4.64) 
These values were chosen because the round off error 
generated in solving the equations was fairly small. 
Other numbers were tested (particularly for 6 and bj) 
and they generated similar results. 
Substituting these values into equation (4.42) 
implies that as n approaches infinity, 
Y = /2 /2 (4.65) 
As mentioned above, the tariff rates are indeterminate, 
but the numerical results (summarized in table 4.1) 
indicate that the tariffs eventually approach zero. 
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Table 4.1. Coefficients for Case 1 
number of number of buyers 
sellers 
2 3 4 5 
a  0.25 0.22 0.19 0.16 
0 0.88 0.80 0.76 0.74 
3 1.76 1.60 1.53 1.48 
Y 1.13 1.02 0.95 0.91 
Y -0.78 -0.92 -0.98 -1.01 
S 0.56 0.67 0.74 0.79 
T* -1.56 -1.01 -0.82 -0.70 
a 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 
0 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.83 
g 1.92 1.83 1.74 1.67 
Y 1.12 1.10 1.03 0.98 
Y 
-0.73 -0.81 -0.87 -0.91 
S 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.74 
T* 
-3.80 -2.28 -1.67 -1.36 
a  0.10 0.15 0.14 0.13 
0 0.95 0.97 0.93 0.90 
6 1.91 1.93 1.87 1.80 
y 1.05 1.11 1.08 1.03 
Y 
-0.75 -0.77 —0.80 -0.84 
S 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.71 
X* 
-5.95 
-3.75 -2.65 -2.07 
a 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.12 
0 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.95 
e 1.85 1.95 1.94 1.90 
Y 0.99 1.08 1.09 1.06 
Y -0.78 
-0.76 -0.77 -0.80 
S 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.70 
T* 
-7.79 -5.26 -3.73 -2.87 
Y = (a+e) > 0 6 = 0.5 
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The first four tables consist of the values of the 
coefficients of the reaction functions and the optimal 
tariffs, generated for various numbers of buyers and 
sellers in the market. On the other side, as the number 
of sellers (m) increases, y decreases to one-half. 
Hence, the optimal tariff approaches minus infinity. 
That is, if the number of exporters is increased, 
without increasing the number of importers, each country 
will offer a larger and larger subsidy. Finally, 
increasing both the number of exporters and importers, y 
approaches one, and the optimal tariff becomes zero. 
The implication for stability is that of the three 
roots, one approaches zero, one is always greater than 
one (in absolute value), and the absolute value of the 
third is slightly less than one. Hence, the solution is 
a saddle point. 
Case 2 
The second case is similar to the first, in that y 
equals the sum of a and 6; but now they are all less 
than zero. As the number of importers is increased, 
y = /2 /2 (4.66) 
which is the negative of the first case. Again, the 
tariff level cannot be determined analytically. The 
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numerical results (table 4.2) indicate that the tariff 
level is not highly responsive to changes in either n or 
m. That is, although the analytical results indicate 
that the tariff can approach a large subsidy as m is 
increased, it requires a much larger m in this case than 
in the first one. 
The analysis of stability is very similar to that 
in the first case. The primary difference is in the 
sign of the roots. However, since the sign of a 
characteristic root is not important—except to indicate 
oscillation—the second solution is also a saddle point. 
Case 3 
The third case comes from setting y  equal to the 
negative of the sum of a and 0. In this case, y is 
negative, and the sum of a and 6 is positive. The 
numerical results are indicated in table 4.3. 
Concerning the reaction coefficients, the only 
difference in this case comes from the signs. Most of 
the limit analysis is the same. However, the level of 
the tariff can be much different. For most values of 
the discount factor, the tariff will still be negative. 
However, as indicated in equation (4.47); used in 
calculating e as m becomes large; it is possible for e 
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Table 4.2. Coefficients for Case 2 
number of 
sellers 
number of buyers 
2 3 4 5 
1 a -0.25 -0.22 -0.19 -0.16 
0 -0.88 -0.80 -0.76 -0.74 
3 -1.76 -1.60 -1.53 -1.48 
Y -1.13 -1.02 -0.95 -0.91 
Y -0.78 -0.92 -0.98 -1.01 
S 0.56 0.67 0.74 0.79 
T* -0.86 -1.61 -0.98 -0.90 
2 a -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 
0 
-0.96 -0.92 -0.87 -0.83 
B -1.92 -1.83 -1.73 -1.67 
Y -1.12 -1.10 -1.03 -0.98 
Y -0.73 -0.81 -0.87 -0.91 
S 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.74 
X* -1.20 -1.31 -1.34 -1.31 
3 a.  -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 
6 -0.95 -0.97 -0.94 -0.90 
0 -1.91 -1.93 -1.87 -1.80 
Y -1.05 -1.11 -1.08 -1.63 
Y -0.75 -0.77 -0.80 -0.84 
S 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.71 
T* -1.52 -1.50 -1.52 -1.51 
4 a 
-0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 
0 
-0.93 -0.97 -0.97 -0.95 
6 -1.85 -1.95 -1.94 -1.89 
Y -0.99 -1.08 -1.09 -1.06 
Y -0.78 -0.76 -0.77 -0.80 
S 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.69 
T* -1.80 -1.69 -1.65 -1.64 
Y  -  ( a  
O
 
V
 
CD +
 6 =  0.5 
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Table 4.3. Coefficients for Case 3 
number of number of buyers 
sellers 
2 3 4 5 
a  0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 
0 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.65 
6 -1.29 -1.28 -1.28 -1.29 
Y -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 
Y -1.16 -1.19 -1.19 
-1.18 
S 
-0.94 
-0.94 -0.95 
-0.95 
X* -0.62 -0.94 -1.07 -1.11 
a 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 
e 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 
g 
-1.34 -1.33 -1.32 -1.32 
Y -0.74 -0.75 -0.75 
-0.75 
Y -1.18 
-1.19 -1.19 -1.18 
S 
-1.06 -1.03 -1.02 -1.02 
X* -0.96 -1.25 -1.40 -1.48 
a  0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 
0 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 
e -1.37 
-.135 -1.34 
-1.34 
Y -0.73 -0.74 -0.74 -0.74 
Y -1.17 
-1.19 -1.19 -1.18 
S 
-1.09 -1.08 -1.07 -1.06 
X* -1.15 
-1.40 -1.56 
-1.65 
a 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 
0 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.68 
6 -1.38 -1.37 -1.36 -1.36 
Y -0.72 -0.73 -0.73 -0.74 
Y -1.16 
-1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
S 
-1.11 
-1.09 -1.09 -1.08 
X* 
-1.27 -1.49 -1.64 
-1.74 
Y ~  " (a+6)  > 0 6 =  0.5 
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to be positive, which means that if the discount factor 
is sufficiently high, the optimal tariff will be 
positive. As m and n increase, it will eventually 
become negative, and then approach zero. This case is 
demonstrated in table 4.5, which was generated with a 
discount factor of 0.8. 
Once again, this solution is a saddle point. 
Changing the signs does not affect stability. There is 
a root greater than one; one that approaches zero, and 
one that is between zero and negative one. 
Case 4 
Set four is generated in a manner similar to set 
three in that y is equal to the negative of the sum of 6 
and a. However, the signs are reversed, and y is 
greater than zero. Again, as n gets large, it appears 
that the optimal tariffs approach zero. However, as m 
increases, the optimal tariff must be a subsidy. Since 
Y is greater than zero, equation (4.47) must always be 
negative. Also, when both m and n get large, the 
optimal tariff becomes zero. These changes can be 
observed in table 4.4. 
Like the other cases, this solution is also a 
saddle point. That is, one characteristic root 
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Table 4.4. Coefficients for Case 4 
number of number of buyers 
sellers 
2 3 4 5 
a  -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 
0 -0.65 
-0.64 -0.64 -0.65 
B 1.29 1.28 1.28 1.29 
Y 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Y 
-1.16 -1.19 -1.19 -1.18 
S 
-0.94 -0.94 -0.95 -0.95 
T* -1.94 -3.04 
-1.37 -1.19 
a  -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
0 
-0.67 -0.66 
-0.6 -0.66 
3 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.32 
Y 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Y -1.18 -1.19 -1.19 -1.18 
S 
-1.06 -103 -1.03 -1.02 
T* -3.51 -2.87 -2.44 -2.13 
a -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
0 -0.68 -0.68 -0.67 -.067 
3 1.37 1.35 1.35 1.34 
Y 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 
Y -1.17 -1.19 
-1.19 -1.18 
S 
-1.09 -1.08 -1.07 -1.06 
X* —4.82 -3.95 -3.36 -2.94 
a  -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
0 
-0.69 -0.68 -0.68 -0.68 
3 1.38 1.37 1.38 1.36 
y 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.74 
Y 
-1.16 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 
S 
-1.11 
-1.09 -1.09 -1.08 
T* 
-5.90 —4.88 -4.18 -3.67 
Y  ~  - ( a + 0 )  < 0 0.5 
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Table 4.5. Comparison of Tariffs 
number of number of buyers 
sellers 
2 4 9 
1 one -13.30 -0.14 -0.01 
two -0.61 -0.83 -0.56 
three -2.47 -2.38 -1.08 
four -2.06 -1.43 -0.82 
Cournot -1.56 -1.25 -0.71 
4 one -10.50 -3.30 
-0.65 
two -1.42 -1.22 -1.21 
three 1.05 1.09 -2.69 
four -6.89 -4.61 -2.69 
Cournot -3.68 -3.13 -2.13 
9 one -22.70 -11.90 -2.90 
two -2.19 -1.79 -1.41 
three 0.77 0.75 0.81 
four -1.17 -8.37 -5.09 
Cournot -5.10 -4.53 -3.47 
Tariffs calculated for 6 = 0.8 
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is less than negative one; one approaches zero, and the 
other is between zero and one. Because of the large 
negative root, the system cannot return to its original 
position if it is perturbed. 
Comparison of Cases 
The tariffs for the various cases are presented in 
tables 4.5 and 4.6. These tables consist of the optimal 
tariffs for each of the five cases with various numbers 
of buyers and sellers in the market. In comparing the 
cases, it is important to consider a few general 
comments first. To begin with, the five solutions (four 
cases plus Cournot) are all very similar. As both m and 
n get large, the optimal tariffs approach zero. In 
fact, in most cases, for a fixed number of exporters, 
increasing the number of importers causes an optimal 
subsidy to decrease monotonically to zero. Note that it 
is possible for the subsidies to start at a lower level, 
increase, and then decrease to zero. However, in the 
numerical results considered, the decrease usually 
begins before there are ten importers in the market. 
Second, as the number of exporters is increased, the 
level of the optimal subsidy generally increases. 
Finally, with the exception of set three, the solutions 
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Table 4.6. Comparison of Tariffs 
number of number of buyers 
sellers 
2 4 9 
one -1.56 -0.81 -0.47 
two —0.86 -0.98 -0.62 
three -0.63 -1.07 -1.01 
four -1.94 -1.37 -0.77 
Cournot -1.56 -1.25 -0.71 
one -7.79 -3.73 -1.60 
two -1.80 -1.65 -1.49 
three -1.27 -1.64 -1.89 
four -5.90 -4.18 -2.51 
Cournot -3.68 -3.13 -2.13 
one -13.75 -8.90 -3.72 
two -2.61 -2.26 -1.90 
three -1.51 -1.76 -2.09 
four -9.53 -7.18 -4.60 
Cournot -5.10 -4.53 -3.47 
Tariffs calculated for 6 = 0.5 
107 
are not highly responsive to changes in the discount 
factor. Some of the tariffs change, but the same 
general pattern remains. Essentially, this result 
seems to imply that the most important variable in the 
system is the number of exporters and importers. 
Although the five cases generate similar solutions, 
they come from different assumptions about how the other 
countries involved will react. Cournot assumes that if 
a tariff is changed, there will be no reaction by either 
type of country. Note that as the number of both types 
of countries increases, the Cournot case becomes a more 
"realistic" assumption, and all of the solutions tend 
toward the free trade results. 
For the other cases, examine a market where the 
number of importers and exporters is small enough so 
that a change in a tariff could generate a measurable 
reaction. These other cases are generated by 
considering how an importing country will respond to a 
change in its own last period tariff (indicated by the 
sign of y), the tariff imposed by the other importing 
countries in the last period (a), and the last period 
tariff imposed by the exporting countries (0 or g). The 
first case is the most straight-forward, in that if any 
country increased its tariff in the last period, country 
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A will be inclined to increase its tariff in this 
period. Hence, this case could be called "full 
retaliation." That is, all countries know that if one 
country increases its tariff, the others will retaliate 
by increasing their own tariffs, hence, decreasing any 
possible gain. In general terms, this solution seems to 
generate the largest subsidy. However, as the number of 
buyers increases, this subsidy appears to drop to zero 
faster than in the other cases. 
In the second case, country A will decrease its 
tariff if the exporting countries raise their tariffs. 
Presumably this action is an attempt to generate lower 
prices for the consumers to maintain their welfare. 
More importantly, if the other importing countries 
increase their tariff, country A will decrease its 
tariff, thus gaining a larger share of the consuming 
market. Although this case tends to generate the lowest 
subsidy, it is also the most consistent. That is, 
changing the number of buyers or sellers in the market 
has little effect on the optimal tariff—perhaps because 
the existing countries are already behaving in a 
"competitive" fashion. That is, rather than challenging 
the other countries, and threatening to increase 
tariffs, country A moves in the opposite direction to 
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"protect" the current level of trade and welfare. 
In the third case, the tariffs of the importing 
country A move in the opposite direction of those 
imposed by the exporting countries. Which means that 
country A is attempting to maintain its position 
vis-a-vis its suppliers. However, if the other 
importing countries attempt to increase their tariffs, 
country A threatens to retaliate with a higher tariff. 
As noted above, this case can actually lead to a 
positive tariff if the discount factor (6) is high 
enough. Apparently, if society places a high value on 
future welfare; and there is a small number of exporters 
and importers; the countries can gain more from the 
tariff revenue than from the respective surplus 
approximation to welfare. Observe that as the number of 
either buyers or sellers increases (above five or six in 
this example), this power over price rapidly diminishes, 
and this case will generate the largest subsidy. 
The final case is similar to the second case, in 
that country A will attempt to protect its current 
position by moving in the opposite direction of tariffs 
imposed by any of the other countries. However, if 
country A increased its tariff in the last period, they 
will have a type of "momentum" and continue to increase 
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their tariff. Also, the other importing countries will 
(in total) change tariffs in the same direction as the 
exporting countries. Hence, the importing countries as 
a group will appear to be threatening to increase their 
tariffs if the exporting countries increase their 
tariffs. Therefore, this case will behave in a manner 
similar to the first case; except there is a damping 
effect. 
Conclusion 
It is important to note that in almost all of the 
cases, the optimal tariff is negative. Although the 
particular behavior of the countries towards each other 
affects the level of the subsidy, the best action is 
still a subsidy. The key to understanding this point is 
that it is not profitable for a country to unilaterally 
grant a subsidy. It is only through perfect 
foresight—when each country knows the other will 
"retaliate"—that all of the countries gain by granting 
a subsidy. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be 
derived from the results is that the solutions behave as 
they might be expected to behave. That is, as the 
market gains exporters and importers, the system 
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approaches free trade. In fact, the conclusion is even 
stronger. As the comparison tables clearly show, the 
most important variables in the system are the number of 
participants. Although there are five types of behavior 
that represent perfect foresight solutions, they all 
generate very similar results. This conclusion seems to 
suggest that although the individual behavior of a 
country will affect the welfare of the "world;" any 
effect is minimal unless there are very few countries 
involved. 
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CHAPTER 5. RETALIATION WITH UNCERTAINTY 
The primary focus of the analysis to this point has 
been to model the behavior of countries that possess 
perfect foresight about how their "opponents" will 
respond to changes in tariffs. A question that seems to 
follow naturally from that analysis is to ask whether or 
not it is possible to model a situation where the 
countries possess some degree of foresight, but there 
may be an element of error in this foresight. Although 
the question flows easily from the last topic, the 
answer is much more complicated. 
When dealing with uncertainty, the overriding 
question that must be answered is: Why does the 
uncertainty exist? To understand the importance of this 
question, consider a situation in which country one does 
not know (with certainty) how country two will react. 
That is, country one starts with a belief about how two 
will react, but this belief is not necessarily correct. 
Given this belief, country one will impose its best 
tariff. Based on country one's tariff, country two will 
then impose some tariff (possibly no change). The point 
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is that this action by country two provides new 
information that country one can use to update its 
belief function. If this retaliation process continues, 
country one should eventually be able to learn two's 
"true" reaction function. A process similar to the one 
described here is precisely what was used to generate 
the perfect foresight solutions in Chapters 3 and 4. In 
other words, even if country one is initially uncertain 
about two's response, the retaliation process is a 
learning process that will eventually allow one to 
determine two's response to any tariff. Hence, the 
question remains, why would uncertainty exist? 
There are essentially three possible reasons why a 
country may be uncertain about how another will react to 
tariff changes. First, both countries may be at the 
start of the retaliation process, and hence, would not 
yet know how the other will respond. Second, a country 
may be intentionally introducing an element of 
randomness into the retaliation process. That is, once 
the optimal tariff has been decided upon, a random 
component is added in, causing a slightly different 
tariff to appear each time. Finally, there may be 
exogenous factors causing uncertainty. For example, a 
country's agricultural exports may depend heavily on the 
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weather, hence the export supply curve would contain a 
random element. This component could affect either the 
intercept term, or the slope of the supply curve. 
Consider the three cases individually. 
Initial Uncertainty 
As can be seen from the analysis in Chapter 3, a 
country may not initially know how another country will 
respond to changes in tariffs. Eventually, a 
retaliation process will generate a belief function that 
is "correct;" but at the start, a country does not 
really "know" how the other will respond. 
An argument of this type is somewhat sophistic, 
because the retaliation process in Chapter 3 never 
really occurs. That is, to generate the perfect 
foresight results, it is only necessary that each 
country be rational—in the sense that they maximize 
some measure of welfare. As a result, there are only 
five possible equilibrium points. At the beginning of 
the process, the only possible uncertainty that can 
exist is which type of reaction the other country will 
pursue: no reaction, full retaliation, or opposite 
retaliation. Even in the "real world," it should be 
fairly straight-forward to decide which process the 
115 
"opponent" will utilize. Therefore, there can be no 
initial uncertainty if each country is rational and 
maximizes some measure of welfare, and also knows that 
the other country is rational. 
Intentionally Introduced Uncertainty 
Uncertainty that may be introduced by an individual 
country is perhaps the most difficult to comprehend. 
The case is considered here primarily for the sake of 
completeness. The manner in which it could be 
introduced can be explained as follows. Country two 
begins with some belief about how country one will 
respond. Then they maximize some welfare function and 
come up with an optimal tariff to impose. Now, they 
randomly generate an error term (presumably from a fixed 
distribution) to be added to this tariff. In other 
words, their reaction function would consist of four 
components. A constant term, a term containing their 
last period tariff, a term containing country one's last 
tariff, and an error term. If the other country 
(country one) is going to possess foresight, they would 
have to know the first three terms with certainty, and 
they would know the distribution from which the error 
term is drawn. The effect of this error term is that 
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country two's retaliation would always vary by some 
amount. From the perspective of country one, there are 
two important consequences. First, the error term would 
make it more difficult to "learn" the reaction function 
of country two. Secondly, there will always be an 
element of uncertainty about the actual tariff level. 
The ultimate question is what does country two gain 
by introducing this uncertainty? At first glance, it 
seems that making it more difficult for country one to 
learn the process may provide a means to acquire 
additional welfare. However, note that because there is 
no actual retaliation process, it does not matter how 
many periods are required to determine the "actual" 
response functions. That is, given the rationality 
assumptions, the retaliation process occurs 
instantaneously. From a slightly different perspective, 
the system utilizes an infinite time horizon, so any 
"delay" would be irrelevant. 
The question as to whether or not country two can 
gain by introducing an error term depends on the degree 
to which the uncertainty about the final tariff can 
influence country one's decision. That is, if the error 
term has a mean of zero, intuitively, the best decision 
that country one can make should be based on the 
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reaction function without the error term. The only 
problem is that the final decision may also be based on 
the variance of the error term. This dependence on the 
variance may prove to be an interesting topic for 
further research, but is outside the scope of this paper 
for several reasons. First, the nature of the 
retaliation has now changed from perfect foresight to a 
situation where a country is trying to deceive another 
country. The essential question then shifts from "What 
is the optimal level of tariff to impose?" to "What is 
the optimal form of deceit to use?". Secondly, the 
dynamic programming methodology may not be the best way 
to model the uncertainty. For example, it may be more 
accurate to use a Bayesian process in which the 
distribution function itself is estimated. 
Exogenous Uncertainty 
Within the two country model, it is interesting to 
examine what would happen if the production, or 
consumption functions were subject to some degree of 
uncertainty. That is, for some purely exogenous reason 
(outside the control of either country), the supply or 
demand curves may change in any given time period. For 
example, an agricultural sector may be subject to 
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fluctuations in the weather, hence, exports may be 
affected by a random component. Alternatively, changes 
in income may influence the level of imports. 
In the model presented in chapter 3, there are two 
possible ways to include this uncertainty. First, the 
intercept terms for the excess supply and demand curves 
may have a random shift term, or, the slope may have a 
random shift parameter. The only problem with 
introducing exogenous uncertainty into this model is 
that the results are negligible. That is, because of 
the linearity of the model, the variance term drops out, 
and since the mean is zero, the conclusions are 
unchanged. However, as an example, it shows how this 
uncertainty can be modelled. 
Consider uncertainty about the intercept terms. 
Let ej and e2, be two independent random variables with 
2 2 
means of zero, and variances denoted and S2. Then, 
the excess supply and demand curves can be written 
Qs = (aj + ej) + b^P (5.1) 
Qd = (ag + eg) - b^CP+Ti+Tj) (5.2) 
Based on the algebra presented in Chapter 3 (delineated 
in Appendix A), it is fairly easy to show that for 
country one (the importing country), the welfare 
approximation can be written 
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Uj — a + bTj + CT2 + 6^212 
+ eT^  + fT| .2 (5 .3)  
where 
a = (a^+ej + a2+e2^^^®^l 
b = (*1+82 + 32+62)/^ 
c = -(aj+ej + a2+e2)/4 
g = -bj/4 
e = -Sb^/g 
f = bj/S 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
Observe that the last three terms do not depend on the 
random elements. The next step is to take the expected 
value of this welfare measure, and then to maximize it 
under the model presented in Chapter 3. Since the means 
of the random terms are zero, taking the expected value 
eliminates the random element from all but the (a) 
coefficient which becomes 
All of the other coefficients have exactly the same form 
as they did in the model without uncertainty. 
Note that each country still possesses as much 
information as the other country. That is, there is 
still perfect foresight about the other country's 
reaction function; up to any degree of uncertainty. 
Hence, if one country is uncertain about a reaction, it 
a = [(aj + 32)^ + (sj + Sg^j/Sb} (5.10) 
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is only because of an exogenous reason, and both 
countries are equally uncertain. Note that the system 
was solved in ^pendix A in general terms for any 
coefficients (a-g). Recall that there were a total of 
five solutions in three sets. First, the values 
satisfying the perfect foresight reaction functions, and 
the optimal tariff, for the Cournot case are 
o i ~ 3 " " 0  ( 5 . 1 1 )  
y = -b/(g + 2e) (5.12) 
T* = y (5.13) 
For the first two cases, the values are 
a = g = ± /1/2Ô (5.14) 
y = (aôc - b - a&cO/a&b^ (5.15) 
T* = y/(l - 2a) (5.16) 
In the last two cases, the values are 
a = -g = ± /l/4g (5.17) 
y = -b/(2g(l+2aâ) - (f-e)) (5.18) 
T* = y (5.19) 
Note that the constant term (a) from the welfare 
equation does not appear in any of the results. Hence, 
the uncertainty has no role in deciding the optimal 
tariff. This conclusion can also be verified from 
standard micro-economic theory. If a welfare function 
is modified by a constant term, the optimal decision 
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will not be affected, since all of the decisions are 
made on the basis of the slope (marginal) of the 
function. Note that the expected level of welfare will 
vary, depending on the variance of the random terms. 
The other way that uncertainty can be introduced is 
to consider that the slope may have a random component. 
Treating this element as a multiplicative element, the 
slope could be expressed as 
e^bi (5.20) 
Where e^ is a term randomly distributed about one, with 
a variance denoted s^. Recall that the constant (a) 
term in the welfare function can be ignored, so consider 
the other terms that contain b^. From equations (5.3) 
through (5.9), it is clear that it only enters into 
coefficients g, e, and f. Further, since the excess 
supply and demand functions are linear, the bj term only 
enters into these welfare coefficients in a linear 
fashion. Hence, as soon as expected welfare is 
considered, the random component e^ will drop out. 
Therefore, the optimal tariff will not be affected by 
this random component either. 
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Conclusion 
The only important conclusion from this analysis is 
that in the linear model considered, exogenous 
uncertainty will not affect the level of the optimal 
tariffs. This conclusion may seem fairly trivial, but 
it could have some ramifications. In a "realistic" 
situation, various exogenous uncertainties exist. From 
the above analysis, it is only necessary to have an 
unbiased estimate of the parameters. Then, the optimal 
tariff will be the same regardless of the degree of 
uncertainty—measured by the variance. One question 
that has not been answered is how exogenous uncertainty 
would affect the solutions in a model that does not rely 
on linear excess supply and demand curves. This paper 
does not seem the appropriate place to attempt an 
answer, since all of the previous analyses rest on this 
assumption. Further, within some neighborhood of an 
equilibrium solution, the linear approximation should 
normally be fairly accurate. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
The historical approaches to optimal tariffs have 
relied on assuming that at least one country has a naive 
belief about how the other country will react to changes 
in tariffs. The objective of this study has been to 
extend that analysis by examining solutions in which 
both countries know how the other will react. It turns 
out that as long as there are no adjustment costs, five 
solutions are consistent with perfect foresight. The 
first case is the well-known Coumot solution, where 
each country believes that the other will not change its 
tariffs in response to a change by the other country. 
In this case, there is a pair of tariffs where this 
assumption holds, and neither country does alter its 
tariff schedule. In many ways, the Cournot tariff is 
the focal point for the other solutions. When just 
considering two countries, there are two sets tariffs 
that are higher than the Cournot tariff, and two that 
are lower. Each of these four sets is generated by a 
different assumption about how the other country will 
react. There are two primary classifications that 
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generate these solutions. In the first, each country 
believes that if they impose a tariff, the other country 
will retaliate and impose a similar tariff, thus 
directly attacking the original tariff. In the second 
case, if one country were to impose a higher tariff, the 
other country would "retaliate" by imposing a tariff 
that is precisely the opposite of the original tariff, 
thus negating the effect of that tariff. 
The importance of the study comes from its ability 
to give all countries involved an "intelligent" 
reaction. That is, in some sense, it is more realistic 
in that if countries did happen to get into a tariff 
war, it seems reasonable that each country would 
eventually learn the other's retaliation process. In 
other words, over time it does not seem reasonable that 
a country can remain ignorant about the other's 
reactions. The main point from the study is that 
perfect foresight solutions actually exist. Previous 
literature has essentially treated the problem by 
claiming that there is no determinate solution. 
The second interesting point generated from the 
study is that perfect foresight solutions for more than 
two countries behave as they would be "expected" to 
behave. As the number of exporters and importers 
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increases, the solution approaches free trade. Which 
means that as the number of participants in the market 
increases, the asset of perfect foresight becomes less 
valuable. When the number of countries is relatively 
large, they all know how the others are going to 
respond, but they cannot take advantage of this 
knowledge because they have no market power. 
As a final point, it should be noted that the study 
is far from being a complete analysis of the perfect 
foresight problem. There are many individual situations 
to which the analysis could be applied. Such as optimal 
tariffs with preferential treatment to certain nations. 
It may also be useful to consider non-linear supply and 
demand curves—especially to examine the effects of 
exogenous uncertainty on the optimal tariffs. However, 
it would still be necessary to retain the symmetry 
between the exporting and importing countries in order 
to arrive at determinate solutions. Another possible 
area for expansion is to relax the symmetry assumption. 
Of course, as soon as this assumption is removed, an 
infinite number of solutions appear. However, it is 
possible that other constraining equations could be 
imposed. That is, a particular country may be operating 
under institutional constraints that would help impose a 
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specific solution. Finally, it may be possible to 
expand the analysis even further by considering a 
country that has control over both price and output; 
possibly through a state trading agency; so that an 
optimal reaction function could be generated in both 
spaces. 
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF OPTIMAL TARIFFS 
This appendix presents the details of the algebraic 
derivation of the optimal tariff for countries one and 
two in a dynamic programming framework. The limiting 
assumptions are that the excess supply and demand curves 
are linear, and the absolute value of their slopes are 
equal. The first step is to show that as a result of 
these assumptions, the optimal tariffs will be 
symmetric. Using this result and perfect foresight, the 
actual levels of the optimal tariffs can be found. 
In algebraic terms, the supply curve is given by: 
For country one imposing an export tariff (T^) and 
country two imposing an import tariff (Tg), the demand 
curve facing the consumers in country two is given by: 
These two equations can be solved for an equilibrium 
price to the sellers in country one (Pe) and equilibrium 
quantity (Qe) expressed in terms of Tj and T2. 
Qs = aj+bjP (Al) 
Qd = ag-biCP+Ti+Tg) (A2) 
Pe - [a2-a2-b2(T2+T2)]/2b2 
Qe = [ aj+a2~b]^(T2^+T2)]/2 (A4) 
(A3) 
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Further, since they will be needed in the calculation of 
the net surplus, it can be shown that 
Pe+a^/b^ = Qe/b]^ (A5) 
and 
ag/bi-fPe+Ti+Tg) = Qe/bj (A6) 
These results follow directly from the definitions of 
the supply and demand curves—just divide each side by 
h-
As in figure 2.1, the value of a tariff to country 
one can be approximated as the sum of the tariff 
revenue, and the net producers' surplus. In notâtional 
form, 
Uj = Qe/2 (Pe+aj/bi) + TjQe (A7) 
= l/(2bp Qe^ + T^Qe (A8) 
Substituting in the values for Qe from (A4) yields 
= (l/8bj)(a2+a2)^'*" ( 
-(l/4)(a^+a2)T2 - (bi/4)TjT2 
-(3/8)bjTj^ + (l/8)bjT2^ (A9) 
To make notation easier, the variables a-g will be 
defined as the above coefficients such that 
Uj = a + bTj + CT2 + gT2T2 
+ elj^ + fTg^ (AlO) 
In a similar manner, it can be shown that for country 
two, 
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Ug = (l/2)Qe(a2/bi-(Ti+T2+Pe)) + TgQe (All) 
Which, using (A6) reduces to 
Ug = (l/2bi)Qe^ + TgQe (A12) 
Equation (A12) is clearly symmetric to equation (A8) 
with respect to and Tg. Therefore, if country two 
follows the same dynamic programming optimization 
process as country one, the optimal tariffs that are 
generated must be symmetric with respect to Tj and T2. 
From the perspective of country one, the dynamic 
programming problem can be expressed in the form of two 
equations. All actions shall be delineated by some time 
period denoted as (t). For country one, the state 
variable will be country two's tariff TgCt). The 
control variable available to country one is its tariff 
Tj(t). The essence of the model is that country one 
cannot influence the current state variable. That is, 
it cannot change the current TgCt). However, country 
two believes that it can influence future levels of Tg. 
The system equation which defines the movement of the 
state variable is 
TgCt+l) = y + aTj(t) + GTgCt) (A13) 
The coefficients p ,  a ,  and 3  are assumed to be known by 
country one, but are essentially variables at this 
point. 
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The objective of country one is to maximize its surplus 
(Uj) subject to equation (A13). Hence, the performance 
criterion can be written as 
K^TgCt)] = (a+bTi+cTg+gTiTg+eTi^+fTgZ) 
+ gKfTgCt+l)] (A14) 
Basically, K[T2(t)] is the present value of the current 
surplus, and future returns discounted by the variable 
6. 
These two equations define the dynamic programming 
problem. The procedure is to first find an expression 
for the function K, and then maximize it with respect to 
TjCt) and solve for the optimal TjCt)* in terms of 
TgCt). 
In general terms, the problem can be solved from 
the next four equations. Differentiating equation (A14) 
with respect to Tj(t), and noting that T2(t) is fixed 
with respect to Tj(t) yields 
b+gT2(t)+2eTj(t)+ctôK'(t+l) = 0 (A15) 
If the function K were known, this equation could be 
solved for TjCt)*. Totally differentiating equation 
(A15) yields 
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0 = (gjdTgCt) + (2e)dTj(t) 
+ a&K''(adT^(t) + gdTgCt)) (A16) 
In order to find the function K, it is necessary to 
differentiate (A14) with respect to TgCt), then, 
applying the envelope theorem yields 
K'(t) = c+gTi*+2fT2+GGK'(t+i) (A17) 
Taking the second derivative generates 
K"(t) = 2f+e^6K"(t+l) 
+ (a3ÔK"+g)dTj*/dT2 (A18) 
The next basic step is to state that the function K can 
be expressed as quadratic in T^. This may seem somewhat 
arbitrary, but it will be shown to be accurate below. 
The reason it works is because the surplus function (U^) 
is quadratic in T^ and Tg. In notational form, for Bq, 
and as yet Unknown, 
K(t) = B^TgCt) + BiTgCt)^ (A19) 
Combining (A14) and (A19) yields 
(b+aôBg+Zag^B^) + (2e+2a^ôBj)Tj(t) 
+ (g+2a6eBj)T2(t) = 0 (A20) 
To simplify the notation, define H,Y,S so that 
H + YT^(t) + STgCt) = 0 (A21) 
As a result, accepting Bj as known, (A21) can be solved 
for 
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Tj(t)* = -H/Y - (S/Y)T2(t) (A22) 
which when differentiated solves for 
dTj*/dT2 = -(S/Y) (A23) 
By using the state equation (A13), (A22) transforms to 
Tl(t)* = (-H-Sm)/Y - a(s/Y)Ti(t-l) 
- B(S/Y)T2(t-l) (A24) 
Equation (A24) defines the optimal Tj in terms of the 
last period's Tj and T2. In order to find Bj, it is 
necessary to combine equations (A19) and (A18) to get 
2Bj = 2f+5B^(2Bj^) + (g+at<S3B^)dT^*/dT2 (A25) 
Substituting in for dT^*/dT2 from (A23) yields an 
equation which can be solved for B^; 
2BJ(1-66^) = 2f - (S^/Y^)Y (A26) 
Note that B^ is a function solely of ô ,a , and not of 
TjCt). That is, the original assumption that K was 
quadratic in T2(t) has been upheld. 
The next basic step is to solve for B^, the linear 
term in the the system equation. Equations (A17) and 
(A19) imply 
BQ+2BiT2(t) = c+gTi(t)+2fT2(t) 
+ 63(Bo+2BiT2(t+l)) (A27) 
Using the defined variable (S), equation (A27) reduces 
to 
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(-S)Tj(t)* = (c+2ô3PBI-(1-Ô3)BO) 
+ 2(f-(l-632)BpT2(t) (A28) 
Since there can be only one functional form for T^ft)*, 
the constant term from equation (A22) must be equal to 
the constant term from equation (A28), or: 
Noting that (H) has a BQ term in it, equation (A29) can 
be solved for 
Notice that the function K has been determined. That 
is J BQ and Bj have been found as functions of 6 ,a ,g ,y . 
Also, Tj(t)* can be found as a function of 6 ,a ,3>y • The 
problem now is to find a,3,w. Imposing perfect 
foresight, y ,a ,6 must be known with certainty. By 
symmetry of the surplus functions for each country, 
equation (A24) must be symmetric to equation (A13) with 
respect to T^(t-l) and T2(t-1), since (A13) could have 
been derived by a similar procedure for country two. 
Therefore, 
H/Y - (c+2(5gaBj-C 1-63 )BQ)/S (A29) 
(c+26gïiBj^)-(b+2a6uBj)(S/Y) 
(a6(S/Y) + (l- g g ) )  (A30) 
M. = -(H+Sw)/Y (A31) 
a = -(S/Y)3  (A32) 
3 = -(S/Y)a  (A33) 
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Combining equations (A32) and (A33) implies first that 
S^/Y^ = 1 (A34) 
and secondly, that 
«2 = g: (A35) 
Observe that; not counting the defined variables S,Y,H; 
there are now five equations: (A25), (A30), (A31), 
(A34), (A35); and five basic unknown variables: Bq, Bj, 
a, 3, y. However, recall that there are actually six 
defined variables (a-g), as denoted by equations (A9) 
and (AlO). Hence, all five variables can be reduced to 
functions of the original model parameters a^,a2)hi and 
the discount rate 6. 
There are two main cases from equations (A34) and 
(A35) that are fruitful, and the Cournot case. First, 
reduce (A34) and (A35) to 
Y = -S (A36) 
a = g (A37) 
App.ying (A37) reduces (A25) to 
= f - e (A38) 
Inserting the values for f and e, yields 
= bi/2 (A39) 
Equation (A30) similarly simplifies to 
Bq = (c+b+4a<SyBj)/(l-2aô) (A40) 
Variable a can be found from equation (A36) by putting 
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in the notation for S and Y: 
= -(2e+g)/(4ô(f-e)) 
Which can be rewritten as 
= 1/26 (A41) 
Note that (A41) generates two values for a (and hence 
g)-
Equation (A31) can similarly be reduced to 
p = -(b-a6b+a6c)/(2a6Bj^) (A42) 
Using (A42), equation (A40) can be reduced to 
Bq = c - b 
= -(1/2)(a2+a2) (A43) 
Putting the values for a-g into equation (A42), y can be 
expressed as 
y = (l-a)(aj+a2)/2b2 (A44) 
Once the values for Bq, Bj, a, 3, y have been 
found, the steady state values for the optimal tariffs 
Tj* and T2* can be found. In general form, using 
symmetry, recall that the tariffs can be expressed as 
TjCt)* = y + gTjCt-l) + aT2(t-l) 
T2(t)* = y + cxTjCt—l) + gT^Ct—1) 
For a steady state solution to exist, the tariff rate in 
one period must be equal to the tariff rate in the next 
period, hence 
Tj* = y(l-3+a)/(l-23+e^-a^) (A45) 
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Tg* = u/(l-e) + a/(l-B) Tj* (A46) 
Applying equation (A45) to the values generated in the 
first case, 
Tj* = y/(l-2a) (A47) 
Tg* = u/(l-2a) (A48) 
Equation (A48) verifies the symmetry. Note that y and a 
are known, and there are two values for each one. 
In the second major case, equations (A34) and (A35) 
are reduced to 
ct = -3 (A49) 
Y = S (A50) 
reduces to the same form as in the first 
case—equation (A39). Equation (A50) can be solved for 
a, such that 
= 1/4-5  (A51) 
Note that g is the negation of a in this case, but once 
again there are two values for a and 3. However, 
Bq = ( c-b-4aôuB2 )/( l+2ciô ) (A52) 
and 
p = -(b+a5BQ)/(g+2a(5Bi-2a^ôBj) (A53) 
Equations (A52) and (A53) can be solved for Bq and M, 
which can then be reduced to 
= —(1/2)(a2+a2) (A54) 
V = (aj+a2)/2bj (A55) 
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Notice that y  does not depend on the value of a  or 3 .  
Using the steady state results from (A45) and (A46), it 
follows that 
= tJ (A56) 
Tg* = u (A57) 
Since y  does not depend on a  or 3 ,  the steady state 
tariffs are also functionally independent of them. 
For the final case, observe that the Cournot 
assumption is also a solution to the system of 
equations. For this case, a and g are both zero, and 
the other equations simplify easily to 
®1 = bj/ô (A58) 
Bq =  - ( l /3 ) (a i+a2)  (A59)  
y = (a2+a2)/4b2 (AGO) 
Finally, the steady state tariffs in this case reduce to 
Tj* = y (A61) 
Tg* = y (A62) 
These results appear similar to the second case, but 
note that the constant term (u) is defined differently, 
hence the actual tariff level is different. 
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APPENDIX B. DERIVATION OF MULTICOUNTRY TARIFFS 
This appendix presents the derivation of the 
optimal tariffs for more than two countries. The excess 
supply and demand curves are linear, and the absolute 
values of their slopes are all equal. All exporters are 
assumed to have identical excess supply curves, and all 
importing countries have identical excess demand curves. 
These limiting assumptions imply that all the countries 
have equal economic power against any one other country, 
and any reaction by one type of country is symmetric to 
reactions by the other countries. Exporting countries 
maximize producer surplus and tariff revenue accruing 
from exported goods. Similarly, importing countries 
maximize consumer surplus and tariff revenue accruing 
from imported goods. 
Consider n buyers and m sellers. Using the above 
assumptions, and using P to represent world price, total 
world supply can be expressed as 
Qs = ma^ + mbj^CP-Tc) (Bl) 
where Tc is the tariff imposed by the exporting 
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countries. Since they are identical, from the 
perspective of the importing countries, there will be 
only one tariff. From the perspective of one importing 
country, there will be (n-1) other importing countries; 
imposing tariff Tb; whose demand can be expressed by 
Qd = (n-l)aj - b^CP+Tb) (B2) 
Finally, the demand by the individual importer imposing 
tariff Ta can be written 
Qd = aj - bi(P+Ta) (B3) 
Combining the two demands yields 
Qd = (n)aj - (n)bj_P - (n-l)bjTb - bjTa (B4) 
Equating (Bl) and (B4) and solving for P yields 
[nai—bi(—mTc+Ta+(n—l)Tb)} 
Pw = (B5) 
(m+n)b]^ 
Substituting the value for Pw into equation (B3) 
generates the equilibrium quantity imported by the one 
importing country: 
Qa = mCa^+agï/Cm+n) + b^/Cm+n) . 
[(l-m-n)Ta + (n-l)Tb - mTc] (B6) 
The welfare that this particular country gains from 
trade can be approximated by the increase in consumers' 
surplus plus the tariff revenue (which is assumed to be 
redistributed in some efficient manner), that is, 
Ua = (l/2bj)Qa^ + TaQa (B7) 
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Using the equilibrium value for Qa from equation (B6) 
yields 
Ua = [m/(m+n)]^ 
+ [m(m+n)-2mbj^(m+n-l)] (a2^+a2)/(m+n)^ Ta 
+ 2mb2(n-l)(a2+a2)/(m+n)^ Tb 
- 2m^b|(a2+a2)/(m+n)^ Tc 
+ (n-l)b2/(m+n)^ TaTb 
- mbj/Cm+n)^ TaTc 
- m(n-l)b2/(m+n)^ TbTc 
- (m+n-l)(m+n+l)b2^/2(m+n)^ Ta^ 
+ (n-l)^b2/2(m+n)^ Tb^ 
+ m^bj/2(m+n)^ Tc^ (B8) 
Note that the level of welfare is now expressed only in 
terms of the three tariffs. To simplify notation, it 
can be written as 
Ua = a + bTa + cTb + dTc + eTaTb + fTaTc 
+ gTbTc + hTa^ + iTb^ + jTc^ (B9) 
From the viewpoint of an individual exporter, the 
process is similar. Since all of the importers are 
identical, they would impose a tariff Tf and their 
demand can be expressed as 
Qd = (n)aj - (n)bi(P + Tf) (BIO) 
The supply by one individual country is written 
Qs = 32 + bi(P - Td) (BID 
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while the supply from the other (m-1) identical 
countries is written 
Qs = (m-Dag + (m-DbjCP - Te) (B12) 
Combining the supply from equations (Bll) and (B12), and 
equating it to the world demand in equation (BIO) 
generates an equilibrium world price 
Pw = (na^ -m2)/b2(n+m) 
+ [(m-l)Te + Td - nTf]/(n+m) (B13) 
Substituting this value into equation (Bll) yields the 
level of exports from this particular country 
Qd = n(a2+a2)/(n+m) 
+ bj[-(n+m-1)Td+(m-l)Te-nTf]/(n+m) (B14) 
Observe that the welfare approximation using producers' 
surplus and tariff revenue is given by 
Ud = (l/2bj)Qd^ + TdQd (B15) 
The important point to note is that the expression 
for welfare gained by an exporter is symmetric to the 
welfare expression for an importer. Hence, it is only 
necessary to consider one type of country, and the 
results will apply to the other type with some minor 
changes. 
Since welfare for one importing country (country a) 
is a function of the three tariffs, it should be 
possible to maximize the welfare by treating Ta as a 
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control variable. The primary problem arises when 
trying to model the responses of the other tariffs to 
changes in Ta. The dynamic programming method presented 
here starts with country A trying to maximize an 
objective function, given some belief about how the 
tariffs imposed in the next period (Tb and Tc) will 
change in response to tariffs in the current period. 
Time periods are denoted (t). The control variable is 
Ta, which is set by country A. The other two tariffs 
represent variables outside the direct control of 
country A and define the state of the system at any 
point in time. The system equations which define the 
movement of the two state variables are given as 
Tbt^l = u + aTa^ + BTc^ (B16) 
Tc^^2 = e + yTa^ + 0Tc^ (Bl7) 
These two equations represent beliefs by country A about 
the manner in which the other countries will respond to 
changes in tariffs. Note first that the equations are 
linear. This linearity comes about because of the 
quadratic nature of the objective function, and will be 
shown to be sufficient below. Second, Tb^ does not 
appear explicitly in the equations. It does appear 
indirectly since Ta^ and Tc^. will be shown to depend 
directly on Tb^. Hence, if Tbj. were to appear in 
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equations (B16) and (B17), some of the equations 
generated below would not be independent. 
The value of the system at any point in time is 
given by 
K(Tb^ ,Tc^)  =  max{U(Ta^ ,Tb^ ,Tc^)  
+ 6K(Tbt+i,TCt+i)} (B18) 
Equation (B18) is basically the value of the current 
surplus, plus the value of any future surplus discounted 
by the factor (g). Since the current welfare function 
is quadratic in three variables, it will be seen that 
the function K is quadratic in the two state variables, 
hence, let 
K(Tb^,Tc^) = BTb^ + CTCj. + DTb^ 
+ ETb^Tcj. + FTCt (B19) 
The system is now fully expressed by equations (B16) 
through (B19). Assuming (initially) that the reaction 
coefficients in equations (B16) and (B17) are known, it 
is possible to find steady state values for the 
coefficients in equation (B19), hence the system will be 
solved. Once this function has been found, the optimal 
value of the control variable (Ta^) is given as a 
function of the two state variables: Tb^ and Tc^,. Using 
equations (B16) and (B17), Ta^^^ can be expressed as a 
function of Tc^ and Ta^ which will be symmetric to 
148 
equation (B17); and as a function of Tb^ and Tc^ which 
will be symmetric to equation (B16). This symmetry will 
then generate the equilibrium values of the reaction 
coefficients in equations (B16) and (B17). 
Following the procedure outlined above, it is first 
necessary to find the optimal value of the control 
variable, which is found by differentiating equation 
(BIB) with respect to Ta^, and setting it equal to zero, 
generating 
0 = b + eTb + fTc + 2hTa 
ô[(B+2DTb^^j+ETct+i)a 
+ (C+ETbt+i+2FTct+i)y] (B20) 
where the (t) subscripts on the tariffs have been 
dropped for clarity. This equation reduces to 
0 = b + iS(oiB+pC) + ) jô(2oiD+yE) + eô(ote+2yf) 
+ eTb 
+ [2h + a6(2piD4YE) + y6(aE+2YF)] Ta 
+ [f + eô(2aD+YE) + 0.<S(a.E+2YF)] Tc (B21) 
This equation can now be solved for an optimal Ta 
Ta* = -(H/Y) - (R/Y)Tb^ - (S/Y)Tc^ (B22) 
where H, S, and Y are defined from equation (B21). 
Using equations (B16) and (B17), (B22) can be 
written 
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— -(h+ye+e;s)/y -  (.ae^^•YS)/Y taj.  
-(ge+eS)/? Tc^ (B23) 
Note that this equation is symmetric to equation (B17). 
Combining this equation and equation (B22) 
^®t+l = (e-0H/Y) - (0e/Y) Tb,. 
+ (-0S/Y + y) TCj. (B24) 
which is symmetric to equation (B16), since all 
importing countries are identical. 
If the state equation (K) is known, the symmetry 
conditions yield solutions for the reaction 
coefficients. That is 
e = -(H + ue + eS)/Y (B25) 
y = -(Be + 0S)/Y (B26) 
0 = -(ae + y S ) / Y  (B27) 
y = e + aH/e (B28) 
a = -ee/Y (B29) 
6 = -0S/Y + Y (B30) 
The next step is to find the state function (K). 
That is, it is necessary to find equations that can be 
solved for the coefficients of equation (B19). These 
coefficients are found by assuming that the reaction 
coefficients are already known, and differentiating the 
objective equation with respect to the two state 
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variables (Tb^ and Tc^). Differentiating both sides of 
equation (B18) with respect to Tb^ 
9.K/3Tbj. = 3.Ua*/9Tbj. + 
3K 9 Tb t+1 9,K 9Tc t+1 
3Tbt+l afbt 9Tc t+1 9 Tb. 
9K 9 Ta* 3 Ta* 9 Te, 
9 Ta* 9TbJ. 9Tc^ 9Tb^ 
(B31) 
Using equation (B19), and equating the constant terms on 
both sides of the equation, equation (B31) implies 
B = c + H (B32) 
Similarly, equation (B18) can be differentiated 
with respect to Tc^. However, the dK/dTa* term 
disappears by the envelope theorem. Hence, 
C+ETb+2fTc = d + 60C + 36B + w(68E+2g6D) 
+ e(20<SF+ôeE) 
+ (S)Ta* 
+ (g)Tb 
+ [2j + 3(0ôE+2e6.D) 
+ e(2eâF+36E)] Te (B33) 
Note that this equation can be reduced to an expression 
of Ta* as a function of Tb^ and Tc^. Since there can be 
only one functional form of the equation, the constant 
term must be equal to the constant term in equation 
(B22), hence, 
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SH/Y = d + Ô0C + BÔB + v(ôeE+26ÔD) (B34) 
Observe that this equation can be solved for the 
variable C as a function of B, D, and E. 
To find a value for (D), equation (B31) can be 
differentiated with respect to Tbj. again, leaving 
2D = 2i + e(-e/Y) (B35) 
Similarly, differentiating equation (B33) with respect 
to TCj. yields 
2F = S(-S/Y) + (2j + 3(.eôE + 26ÔD) 
+ 8(285?+p6E)) (B36) 
Finally, using either equation (B31) or equation (B33) 
and differentiating by the appropriate tariff generates 
E = g + S(-e/Y) (B37) 
Hence, there is a system of equations which can be 
solved to yield the function K in terms of the reaction 
coefficients. Since the reaction coefficients are also 
expressed as functions of the coefficients of K, there 
is now a system of eleven non-linear equations and 
eleven variables. Fortunately, this system can be 
separated into two sets of equations: seven equations 
involving D, E, F, a, 3, Y» and 6; and four equations 
involving the above values, plus B, C, y, and e. 
Unfortunately, only the second set can be solved 
analytically (once the other values are known). 
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However, the first set can be reduced to equations that 
yield interesting information. They can also be solved 
numerically to show some of the interrelationships 
between the optimal tariffs, and the number of exporters 
and importers in the system. 
Consider equations (B26), (B27), (B29), and (B30). 
Equation (B29) generates a nice description of Y, and 
equation (B30) can be solved for S/Y. Substituting this 
latter value into equation (B26), and simplifying, 
yields an expression for (p) as a function of 3» a ,  and 
0. Similarly, equation (B27) can be written so that 6^ 
is a function of a , 3> and y. Putting these two 
equations together 
-  ( a  +  8 )^ (B38) 
Substituting this result back into the expression for B 
from equation (B30) 
3 = ± 2e (B39) 
Before looking at the overall solution, some 
interesting observations can be made about these two 
equations. First, equation (B38) is very similar to the 
results presented in Chapter 3. That is, the exporter's 
reaction is equal to (or the opposite of) the reaction 
of the importer (or importers in this case). Second, 
the reaction by country B to country C is seemingly 
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twice that of country A. However, it only appears that 
way, since Ta^ appears in equation (B16) and not Tb^, so 
the factor of two takes into account the simultaneity 
mentioned above. Finally, note that the Cournot case is 
also a solution of the equations. In this case, a, 3> 
y, and 0 are all equal to zero. 
A great deal of analysis can be conducted with 
these four main equations, but the system cannot be 
solved analytically. However, the equations relating D, 
E, and F can be reduced to functions of the four 
reaction coefficients from equations (B35), (B37), and 
(B38). The basic idea is to start with guesses for ex 
and 6, and use these guesses to generate new values for 
a and 0 which are (hopefully) closer to the true values. 
There are many algorithms to solve systems of nonlinear 
equations, however, these functions appear to be 
extremely unstable, so it is necessary to use a process 
of bisection over two variables. Given the initial 
guesses of a and 6, (B38) gives a value for y, (B39) 
gives a value for g. Y and S can be derived from 
equations (B29) and (B30). Values for D, E and F are 
found sequentially from equations (B36), (B37) and 
(B38). New values for Y and S are then calculated from 
their definition in equation (B21). Finally, zeros for 
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each variable are created by subtracting the right hand 
sides in equations (B27) and (B29). Of course, equation 
(B38) generates two values (positive and negative) for 
y. 
Once the values of these variables are found, it is 
fairly straight-forward to solve the second set of 
equations. Equation (B25) can be solved for 
e = y(Y - e0)/(Ye + Y + Se) (B40) 
Note that e is related to y by a "constant" multiplier, 
(call it V) in the sense that values for those variables 
have already been found. Hence, from equation (B28) 
H = yd - V)Y/ 6 (B41) 
The value for B follows easily from equation (B32). C 
is derived from equation (B34). The equations can be 
simplified by making the following substitutions: 
Za = (S (2oi.D + yE) 
Zb — Ô (otE + 2yF) 
Zc = (S(eE + 2gD) 
Zd = 6(2eF + gE) (B42) 
Using these definitions, the system can be solved. For 
clarity, define 
Zw = (l-aô)(l-V)Y/0 + (Za+VZb) 
Zx = (36Y-S)(l-V)/0 - (Zc+VZd) 
Zy = (d+66c)/(e<5-l) - (b4a6c)/Ya (B43) 
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Hence, 
u = Zy/[Zw/Y6 + Zx/(0Ô-1)] (B44) 
The values for e, B, C, and H follow by substituting 
back into the previous equations. 
Now that all of the coefficients have been found, 
it is possible to find the steady state values of the 
three tariffs. In steady state equilibrium, the tariffs 
remain constant over time, so the time subscript will be 
ignored. Substituting the resulting equation (B17) into 
equation (B16) expresses Tb as a function of Ta 
Tb = u+.es/d-e) + [A+GY ' /d-e)]  Ta (B45) 
Similarly, when substituting (B17) into the optimal 
tariff for country A found in equation (B22), let 
I 
Xa = 1 + (S/Y)Y/(1-0) (B46) 
Then, 
Ta = (-H/Y -(S/Y)e/(l-0))/Xa 
- (e/Y)/Xa Tb (B47) 
Combining equation (B46) and (B47) yields the steady 
state value for the optimal tariff 
Ta = (-H/Y -(S/Y)e/(l-0) 
- (e/Y)(y + 6e/(l-0)) 
/ (Xa + (e/Y)(a+gY/(l"8)) (B48) 
The other tariffs can then be found from equations (B45) 
and (B17). 
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APPENDIX C. ALGORITHM TO FIND MULTICOUNTRY TARIFFS 
program dissmn(input,output); 
uses transcend; 
var alpha,beta,gamma,theta,mu,epsilon, 
8,y,hl,mlg,bO,cl,dl,el,fl,a,b,c,d,e,f, 
g,h,i,j ; real; 
delta,al,a2,bl,pi,p2: real; 
ax,bx,cx,dx,erl,er2 : real; 
xll,xlh,x21,x2h,xlinc,x2inc,cut : real; 
np,m,n,npl,np2 : integer; 
tariffa,tariffb,tariffc : real; 
8etl,er,prbsl :boolean; 
yb : char ; 
procedure funKxl,x2:real; var yl,y2:real); 
var tl,t2: real; 
begin 
er := true; 
alpha := xl; 
theta := x2; 
gamma := mlg * (theta + alpha); 
beta := 2*mlg * theta; 
if (alpha = 0) or (theta = 0) then exit(funl); 
y := -theta*e/alpha; 
s := (gamma-beta)*y/theta; 
dl := i - e*e/(2*y); 
el := g - e*8/y; 
tl := -s*s/(2*y) + j + beta*theta*delta*el 
+ beta*beta*delta*dl; 
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t2 ;= l-theta*theta*delta; 
if t2 = 0 then exit(funl); 
fl := tl/t2; 
tl := (2*alpha*dl + gamma*el)*delta; 
t2 := (alpha*el + 2*gamma*f1)*de1ta ; 
y := 2*h + alpha*tl + gamma*t2; 
8 := f + beta*tl + theta*t2; 
if y = 0 then exit(funl); 
y2 := theta + (alpha*e + gamma*s)/y; 
yl := alpha + theta*e/y; 
er := false; 
end; (* funl *) 
procedure fun2; 
var tl,t2,t3,t4,ql,q2,q3,q4,q5 :real; 
begin 
ql := (y-e*theta)/(y*theta + y + s*theta); 
q2 := delta*(2*alpha*dl + gamma*el); 
q3 ;= delta*(alpha*el + 2*gamma*fl); 
q4 := delta*(theta*el + 2*beta*dl); 
q5 := delta*(2*theta*f1 + beta*el); 
tl := (l-alpha*delta)*(l-ql)*y/theta + q2+ql*q3; 
tl := tl/(gamma*deIta); 
t2 := (beta*delta*y -s)*(l-ql)/theta - q4-ql*q5; 
t2 ;= t2/(delta*theta - 1); 
t3 := (b + alpha*delta*c)/(gamma*delta); 
t4 ;= (d + beta*delta*c)/(delta*theta-l) - t3; 
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mu := t4/(tl + t l ) ;  
epsilon := mu*ql; 
cl := -tl*mu -t3; 
hl := -(mu - epsilon)*y/thêta; 
bO ;= c + hl; 
end; (* fun2 *) 
procedure eval(xl,x2:real; var yl,y2;real); 
begin 
if setl then funl(xl,x2,yl,y2) 
else fun2; 
end; (* eval *) 
procedure bisectKnp: integer ; er,vf ,aq,bq:real; 
var pl,tx:real); 
var al,bO,ta,tb,tp,el,p :real; 
i : integer; 
begin 
al := aq; bO ;= bq; i := 0; 
eval(al,vf,ta,tx); 
eval(bO,vf,tb,tx); 
repeat 
pl ;= (al+b0)/2; 
eval(pl,vf,tp,tx); 
el := absCtp); i := i+1; 
if (prbsl) then writeln(i,' ',pl,' ',tp); 
if tp*ta >0 then 
begin 
al := pl; ta := tp; 
end (* 1st *) 
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else 
begin 
bO := pi; tb := tp; 
end; (* if *) 
until (el<er) or (i>np); 
end; (* bisectl *) 
procedure bi8ect2(npl,np2:integer; erl,er2,aq,bq,cq,dq:real; 
var pl,p2:real); 
var cr,dr,tc,td,tp2,e2,tl,pz :real; 
i : integer; 
begin 
cr := cq; dr := dq; i := 0; 
bisectKnpl ,erl ,cr,aq,bq,pl ,tc) ; 
bisectKnpl,erl,dr,aq,bq,pl,td) ; 
repeat 
p2 := (cr + dr)/2.0; pz := p2; 
bisectKnpl,erl,p2,aq,bq,pl,tp2) ; 
p2 := pz; 
e2 ;= ab8(tp2); i := i+1; 
writeln('* ',i,' ',p2,' ',tp2); 
if tp2*tc > 0 then 
begin 
cr := p2; tc ;= tp2; 
end (* Ist *) 
else 
begin 
dr := p2; td := tp2; 
end; (* if *) 
until (e2<er2) or (i>np2); 
end; (* bisect2 *) 
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procedure initvars; 
var tl,t2:real; 
begin 
tl := m/(m+n); t2 := al+a2; 
a := 8qr(tl*t2)/(2*bl); 
b := (tl-2*m*bl*(in+n-l)/sqr(m+n) )*t2 ; 
c := 2*m*bl*(n-l)/sqr(m+n)*t2; 
d := -t2*2*bl*8qr(tl); 
e := ((n-l)/(m+n) -(m+n-l)*(n-l)/sqr(m+n))*bl; 
f := ((m+n-l)*m/sqr(m+n) - tl)*bl; 
g := -bl*(n-l)*tl/(m+n); 
h := (sqr(m+n-l)/(2*8qr(in+n))-(m+n-l)/(m+n))*bl; 
i ;= (sqr(n-l)/(2*8qr(m+n)))*bl; 
j := sqr(tl)/2 *bl; 
mu ;= 0; epsilon := 0; 
hi := 0; bO ;= 0; cl := 0; 
end; (* initvars *) 
procedure results ; 
begin 
writeln; writeln; 
writeln('mu = ',mu); writeln('alpha = alpha); 
writeln('beta = ',beta); writeln('gamma = ',gamma); 
writeln('epsilon = '.epsilon); writeln('theta = theta); 
writeln; 
writeln('b = ',bO); writeln('c = ',cl); 
writelnCd = ',dl); writeln('e = ',el); 
writeln('f = ' ,fl) ; 
writelnC'y = ',y); 
writeln('s = ',s); 
writeln('h = ',hl); 
end; (* results *) 
f 
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procedure lims(var ax,bx,cx,dx,erl,er2:real; 
var npl,np2:integer); 
var ya : char; 
tl,t2,fl,f2 : real; 
begin 
erl := 0.0001; er2 := 0.0001; 
npl ;= 35; np2 ;= 35; 
writeln; 
writeC'print data during bisectl?'); readln(ya); 
if ya = 'y' then prbsl := true; 
writeC'change error for inside?'); readln(ya); 
if ya ='y' then 
begin 
write('err = ',erl); readln(erl); 
writeCctr = ',npl); readln(npl); 
end; (* if *) 
write('change error for outside?'); readln(ya); 
if ya = 'y' then 
begin 
write('err = •,er2); readln(er2); 
writeCctr = ',np2); readln(np2); 
end; (* if *) 
repeat 
repeat 
writeC'low inside: '); readln(ax); 
write('high inside: '); readln(bx); 
write('low outside: '); readln(cx); 
eval(ax,cx,fl,t2); 
eval(bx,cx,f2,t2); 
if fl*f2 > 0 then writeln('***error'); 
writelnCfl = ',fl,' f2 = ',f2); 
writeC'continue?'); readln(ya); 
if ya = 'i' then 
begin 
results ; 
write ('continue?'); readln(ya); 
end; (* if *) 
until ya = 'y'; 
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write('high outside: '); readln(dx); 
bisectKnpl,er 1 ,cx,ax,bx,tl,fl) ; 
bisectKnpl,erl,dx,ax,bx,tl,f2) ; 
if fl*f2 > 0 then writelnC'***error'); 
writeln('fl = ',fl,' f2 = ',f2); 
write('continue?'); readln(ya); 
if ya = 'i' then 
begin 
results ; 
writelnC'continue?'); readln(ya); 
end; (* if *) 
until ya = 'y'; 
end; (* lims *) 
procedure getvars; 
var yb : char; 
begin 
write('default vars '); readln(yb); 
if yb = 'y' then 
begin 
delta := 0.5; m ;= 2; n := 2; bl := 2; 
al := 10; a2 ;= -5; mlg := 1; 
end (* 1st *) 
else 
begin 
writeln; 
write('dscnt factor = '); readln(delta); 
write(sellers (m) = '); readln(m); 
write('# buyers (n) = '); readln(n); 
writeC'abs slope (bl) = '); readln(bl); 
write('demand intcpt = '); readln(al); 
writeC'supply intcpt = '); readln(a2); 
writeC'gamma mult. +-1 = '); readln(mlg); 
end; (* if *) 
end; (* getvars *) 
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procedure tariffs; 
var tl,t2,t3,t4 : real; 
begin 
tl := epsilon - theta*epsilon + gamma^epsilon; 
t2 := 1 - 2*theta + theta*theta - gamma*gamma; 
tariffa := tl/t2; 
t3 := ep8ilon/(1-theta); 
t4 := gamma/(1-theta); 
tariffc := t3 + t4*tariffa; 
tariffb := mu + alpha*tariffa + beta*tariffc; 
writeIn; 
writelnC'tariff a = ',tariffa); 
writeln('tariff b = '.tariffb); 
writeln('tariff c = '.tariffc); 
writeln; 
end; (* tariffs *) 
procedure bsct; 
begin 
getvars; 
initvars; 
setl := true; 
prbsl := false; 
Iims(ax,bx,cx,dx,erl,er2,npl,np2); 
biBect2(npl,np2,erl,er2,ax,bx,cx,dx,alpha,theta); 
fun2 ; 
results ; 
tariffs; 
end; (* bsct *) 
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procedure range; 
var ya : char; 
begin 
write('set two?'); readln(ya); 
if ya = 'y' then setl := false; 
writeC' low xl 
write('high xl 
write('incr 
writeIn; 
write(' low x2 
write('high x2 
write('incr 
'); readln(xll); 
'); readln(xlh); 
'); readln(xlinc); 
'); readln(x2l); 
'); readln(x2h); 
'); readln(x2inc); 
writeln; 
write('zero cutoff : '); readln(cut); 
end; (* range *) 
procedure cmpr(y:real; var t: char); 
begin 
t := '+'; 
if abs(y) < cut then t;= 
if y < 0 then 
begin 
t := 
if absCy) < cut then t := 
end; (* if *) 
end; (* cmpr *) 
procedure map; 
var i,j ; integer; 
xl,x2,yl,y2 : real; 
tl,t2 ; char; 
begin 
setl := true; 
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getvars; 
initvars; 
range; 
npl := trunc((xlh-xll)/xlinc + 0.5); 
np2 := trunc((x2h-x2l)/x2inc + 0.5); 
if np2 > 40 then np2 := 40; 
writeln('inside (vert): ',xll,' to ',xlh,' by ',xlinc); 
writeln('outside (hor): ',x21,' to ',x2h,' by ',x2inc); 
writeln('cutoff : ',cut,' neg=. pos=,'); 
writeln; 
for i := 1 to npl+1 do 
begin 
xl := xlh - (i-1) * xlinc; 
for j := 1 to np2+l do 
begin 
x2 := x21 + (j-1) * x2inc; 
eval(xl,x2,yl,y2) ; 
tl ;= ' '; t2 := ' '; 
if not er then 
begin 
cmpr(yl,tl); 
cmpr(y2,t2); 
end; (* if *) 
write(' ',tl,t2); 
end; (* for j *) 
writeln; 
end; (* for i *) 
end; (* map *) 
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begin (* PROGRAM BEGINS HERE *) 
repeat 
write('m)ap b)isect, q)uit'); 
readln(yb); 
if yb = 'b' then bsct; 
if yb = 'm' then map; 
until yb = 'q'; 
end. (* temp dissmn *) 
